

Peru's Education Reform

by Norman Gall


American Universities Field Staff (1974)



Peru's Education Reform

Part I: More Schools

by Norman Gall



PERU

Tension between teachers and the military government is just one of many obstacles facing the Education Reform. At least as serious is the continuing contradiction between the "Revolutionary Government's" libertarian rhetoric and its dictatorial methods and the Ministry of Education's mandarin bureaucracy.

[NG 3 '74]

Fieldstaff Reports

American
Universities
Field Staff

x

The American Universities Field Staff

THIS FIELDSTAFF REPORT is one of a continuing series on international affairs and major global issues of our time. All Reports in the series are prepared by writers who are full-time Associates of the Field Staff, spending long periods abroad and returning to the United States periodically to lecture on the campuses of the universities and colleges that sponsor the American Universities Field Staff.

Associates of the Field Staff are chosen for their ability to cut across the boundaries of the academic disciplines in order to study societies in their totality, and for their skill in collecting, reporting, and evaluating data. They combine long personal observations with scholarly studies relating to their geographic areas of interest.

The American Universities Field Staff, Inc., was founded in 1951 as a nonprofit educational organization. Fieldstaff Reports have for twenty years reached a group of readers — both academic and nonacademic — who find them extraordinarily useful as a source of firsthand observations of political, economic, and social trends in foreign countries.

In the 1970s, the Field Staff is undertaking a long-term program to scrutinize and report on man's response to the disturbing effect of modernization on his value systems. Studies of problems related to population growth and of problems associated with the institution of education will be published from time to time as Fieldstaff Reports.

The Reports related to population growth are the product of a joint project of the American Universities Field Staff and the California Institute of Technology. Under the latter's sponsorship, the project is engaged in a comparative study of the social and political matrices in which population problems occur.

All publications under the imprint of the American Universities Field Staff (including articles published under the auspices of the joint project with the California Institute of Technology) are not selected to accord with an editorial policy and do not represent the views of the Field Staff's membership. Responsibility for accuracy of facts and for opinions expressed in this Report and in all Fieldstaff Reports rests solely with the individual writer.

ALAN W. HORTON
Executive Director

About the writer:



NORMAN GALL has been reporting on Latin American affairs for more than a decade. Having studied at Emory University and New York University (A.B. 1956), he traveled extensively in the Caribbean as a reporter for *The San Juan Star* from 1961 to 1964, devoting special attention to events in the Dominican Republic between the fall of the Trujillo dictatorship in 1961 and the 1965 U.S. military intervention. As a freelance journalist since 1964, he has reported in depth on political and economic developments in Mexico, Guatemala, Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile. His work has been appearing frequently over the past decade in such publications as *The Economist*, *Le Monde*, the *Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *Commentary*, *The New York Review of Books*, *Dissent*, *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, and *The New Leader*. In 1967 he was awarded a special fellowship to study at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and in 1968 he received a Guggenheim Fellowship for research and writing in Venezuela. He has also been the recipient of a Houghton Mifflin Literary Fellowship Award. Appointed a Field Staff Associate in 1971, Mr. Gall currently resides in Caracas and reports on significant developments in the Caribbean and Andean areas.

University Members: University of Alabama · Brown University · California Institute of Technology · Dartmouth College · University of Hawaii
Indiana University · University of Kansas · Louisiana State University · Michigan State University · Tulane University · University of Wisconsin

PERU'S EDUCATION REFORM

Part I: More Schools

by Norman Gall

December 1974

The pressures of population growth on the resources of a developing society are felt through three main variables: quantitative increase in the number of people; rises in the levels of consumption and economic participation per inhabitant; and variations in per capita productivity through changes in the manpower's age structure and in its economic yields.

The development of Peruvian education in recent decades provides a striking example of the interplay of these factors. While only one in every forty Peruvians had access to public education in 1900, the proportion of those participating in the education system rose to one-in-four by the mid-1960s. While Peru's population has increased since 1900 at the geometric rate of 1.9 per cent annually, enrollments have risen at 5.4 per cent per year during the same period, or nearly three times as fast as population, reflecting one of the world's highest rates of educational expansion in this century. At the same time, education's share of Peru's public budget rose from 2.9 per cent in 1900 to 30 per cent in 1966, one of the highest in Latin America, and this severely strained the financial resources of the state as continued high birthrates and dramatic declines in infant mortality radically expanded the school-age population. The rapid educational expansion, while showing spectacular growth rates in the remote and backward Departments of the Andes, also has been closely associated with urbanization and migration to the coastal cities. In Metropolitan Lima, roughly 47 per cent of the population between the ages of five and 39 was engaged in some kind of formal education in the 1970-1972 period.

These Reports attempt to illustrate the stake in education of the Peruvian people as their "Revolutionary Government" of generals and colonels attempts to carry out a major Education Reform. On one hand, the expansion of schooling is one of the principal means of increased consumption and opportunity for the common man in Peru; it provides the single clear and coherent expression of social democracy in Peru's recent history, growing both in impact and momentum in the course of this century. On the other hand, the waste and chaos of educational expansion has severely limited Peru's economic productivity, imposing heavy financial burdens on the state and society and aggravating the immediate consequences of its high (3.1%) population growth rate. Educational expansion can pay for itself by increasing the productivity of the labor force, and, as elsewhere, by reducing family size. A major goal of Peru's Education Reform is to build an educational system that will spur rather than retard economic development.

* * * * *

Some pedagogues imagine that if a man knows the sources of the Amazon and the mean temperature of Berlin he has gone half-way toward solving social problems. If by some miracle our illiterates would wake up tomorrow not only knowing how to read and write, but also with university diplomas, the Indian problem will not have been solved. The proletariat of the ignorant will be succeeded by that of bachelors and doctors. Physicians without patients, lawyers without clients, engineers without projects, writers without readers, artists without patrons, professors without disciples, all abound in the most civilized nations, forming the vast army of brains with learning and stomachs without bread. Where the haciendas of the coast measure 8,000 acres, where those of the sierra are from 30 to 50 leagues, the nation must be divided into lords and serfs.

From Manuel Gonzales Prada, *Nuestros Indios* (1904).

The schoolhouse at Mallma¹ stands at the eastern extreme of the Hacienda Lauramarca in the highlands of southern Peru, alongside the dirt road that crosses the barren mountains of the Department of Cuzco and slowly descends to the jungle outpost of Puerto Maldonado, two days' journey beyond. The school, a sagging, whitewashed adobe structure with two tiny windows and a thatched roof, is cradled in the narrow valley of the Rio T'inqui; the river descends through a gray-green landscape of grass, stubble, and glacial stone from the white slopes of Mount Ausanecate, 21,000 feet high, which holds all Lauramarca in its spiritual and ecological dominion. According to the Indians, the white mountain is a god who has abandoned his people. This feeling of abandonment haunts the people of Lauramarca, as they emerge from their traditional ways into an incipient, perhaps stillborn modernization.

The school at Mallma is dark and damp and windy for most of the year. Its single classroom—divided by a flimsy partition so the teacher can conduct two groups at the same time—is furnished with old wooden school desks, some homemade and others provided by the Ministry of Education. It is populated by children of a wide variety of ages who can communicate only in Quechua—the ancient Andean tongue that in its many local dialects is still the vernacular of most of the highlands of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador—and who come to school in traditional Indian dress of brightly colored wool caps, red and black homespun clothing, and sandals cut from old rubber tires. Most of the pupils sit two and three abreast at the desks, laboriously copying and memorizing dimly understood Spanish words from the blackboard


and reciting aloud from carefully preserved copies of *Lola y Pepe*, a reading primer issued in 1950. Those without seats spend their days in the half-darkness along the walls on dank benches made of adobe bricks,² beneath yellowed paper portraits of the martyred naval heroes of Peru's disastrous War of the Pacific against Chile (1879-1884).³ Since the school provides instruction only through the second grade, one can expect only modest educational achievements before its pupils are reclaimed by the rural routine of pasturing llamas and alpacas, and growing potatoes.

Although the peasants at Mallma built their school 40 years ago in a show of great enthusiasm and determination, paying the first teachers' salaries from their own pockets, enrollment has declined in recent years to the point that some parents have taken to matriculating their children over and over again to prevent the school from closing for lack of pupils. "This is because having a school gives a community a certain importance," one of the teachers at Lauramarca told me. "A school puts a remote Indian community on the map. The government sends representatives—school inspectors—to inquire from time to time about the school and the community. In turn, the community can get outside help through the school. The number of one-room schools at Lauramarca has expanded so fast that there are not enough children to attend them. At Mallma there are 30 pupils enrolled, but the average daily attendance is only 15 because the parents say the children must pasture their animals. However, attendance shoots up suddenly when the teacher or inspector threatens to close the school. After two years in school the pupils at least know how to sign their names."



The view from Mallma, Hacienda Lauramarca, Cuzco, with Mount Ausanecate in the background.

The founder of the school at Mallma is Constantino Condori Mandora, an 86-year-old Indian who wears a floppy sheepskin hat and a tattered brown poncho on his excursions outside his family's adobe hovel next to the road and the school, two landmarks around which the peasants of Mallma have tended to cluster their homes in recent years. The old man walks with great difficulty and his eyes are crusted with the covering of a trachoma that has left him almost completely blind. When I asked don Constantino why the people of Mallma made such sacrifices to send their children to school, he explained that "we want them to learn just a few words [of Spanish]. We don't want our children to be illiterate like us, nor to suffer for their ignorance like we do. We can't do any business or enter any government office ourselves, because we don't know anything. For any letter or document we must pay a *tintorillo* [scribe] to write it out and sign it for us. I decided to organize the school 40 years ago when the manager



Constantino Condori Mandora.

of the hacienda ordered me to go to the city of Cuzco to serve as a *pongo* [unpaid servant] in his house there. When I said I wanted to send a substitute to work in my place, the manager sent me to Cuzco with a letter to the chief of police saying that I was an enemy of the hacienda and didn't want to work, that I should be jailed by the police. Because I couldn't read, I had no way of knowing what the letter said. Fortunately, I showed the letter first to a friend, who showed it to a lawyer, who said there was no legal reason for me to go to the police station and that I should return to my community. It was then that I decided to organize the school to end our ignorance. First we paid the teachers ourselves, and then the Adventists ran the school. The Ministry of Education took it over in 1961. We can say we have benefited from the school's existence because our children have learned, at least, to say Buenos Dias, Buenas Tardes, and Buenas Noches."

The 200,000 acres of rolling, windy *puna* that compose the Hacienda Lauramarca are located in the Province of Quispicanchis, one of the more remote economically backward and demographically stagnant areas of the Peruvian sierra. With high mortality, poor communications, low migration rates, and the bulk of its people surviving by primeval forms of subsistence agriculture, Quispicanchis is one of the 11 of Cuzco Department's 13 provinces that had neither gained nor lost significantly in population between the censuses of 1940

and 1972; in that period Peru as a whole had doubled in population and the number of people living in "urban areas"⁴ quadrupled. According to the 1940 census, only 15 per cent of the population of Quispicanchis above age five had ever attended school. Around that time Bernard Mishkin wrote in his essay on "The Contemporary Quechua":

The sierra, although it is the most densely populated region of the country with the largest number of populated centers, is the most lacking in educational facilities. Enormous areas are to be found in which not one school exists. In some places, Quechua communities attempted to fill a sharply felt need by establishing classes in Spanish at their own expense. But these schools were soon abandoned. The mestizo teachers, who had not completely mastered the alphabet, lost heart when they were unable to collect the pittance they were promised. The children, on the other hand, lost whatever interest they had at the outset as a result of the miserable instruction... In those places where the Indians have access to schools, language proves to be an insuperable difficulty for the Quechua students. Instruction, in practically all cases, is given in Spanish. The Quechua students are unable to follow it and, after a brief but unsuccessful effort, are satisfied to devote themselves to tidying



Schoolchildren at Mallma, with the teacher.

the school grounds and to physical education. Meanwhile, the teacher can concentrate his best efforts in behalf of the mestizo children who come from Spanish-speaking homes.⁵

In 1957 the Peruvian anthropologist Gustavo Alencastre visited the Hacienda Lauramarca for the Ministry of Labor to report on social conditions after the serfs formed a *sindicato* and went on strike in response to a pasture enclosure movement carried out by the hacienda's new Argentine owners. Because of the long history of social conflict at Lauramarca and because this was the first peasant *sindicato* to be formed in Cuzco in recent decades,⁶ Alencastre's report, recommending expropriation, was read with great interest by officials in Lima and then suppressed.⁷ The report contained the findings of a 1957 census which revealed that, of the 2,929 persons above seven years old on the hacienda, only 163 knew how to read and write, and many of these literates were managers, drivers, and clerks working at T'inqui, the hacienda's administrative center; of the 812 children between seven and 16 years old, only 50 (six per cent) were attending the three schools then functioning on the hacienda.

However, some important changes were already under way. Between 1956 and 1963, primary school enrollments nearly doubled in Quispicanchis, reaching 7,451 pupils and then climbing more slowly over the following decade to about 10,000 in 1973. By the time of my first visit to Lauramarca in 1970, shortly after the hacienda was expropriated under the sweeping land reform carried out by the military regime that seized power in late 1968, the number of two-year schools had risen sharply from three to seven. In the four years since the hacienda was expropriated and turned into a cooperative under the agrarian reform, few of Lauramarca's 975 peasant families have participated in the affairs of the cooperative, distrusting the government officials who came to take the place of the hacienda's managers and preferring to grow their own potatoes and tend their own livestock. However, perhaps the most palpable change generated by the new cooperative was the establishment of a five-year primary school at T'inqui, which for the first time gave the people of Lauramarca a chance to finish their primary schooling without going beyond the boundaries of an estate that is roughly the size of Luxembourg or Rhode Island. Beyond this, the peasants themselves

are building a second five-year primary school at Pampacancha, another of Lauramarca's roadside settlements, with factory-made roof and doors provided by SINAMOS, the civilian political arm of the military regime.⁸

"The new school will have two classrooms, and is being built with each family contributing 100 adobes each," said Claudia Alarcón de Vega, the teacher at Pampacancha who founded the present school in 1965. "When I came here nine years ago I was very lonely. There was just the school, which had been used before to teach literacy classes, and two huts beside the road; and I was very afraid to be alone at night. But the people were very good to me and very enthusiastic about the school. I used this enthusiasm to get them to build stone fences around the school, a chapel, and a cooperative store, and they provided the school with desks,

Sixto Flores Yucra, first president of the Lauramarca Cooperative, Cuzco, 1970.



tables, and a blackboard. In the old school the papers fly and the pupils catch cold when the wind blows down the valley, but the new school will have larger windows giving more light and is being built so the wind won't blow across the classrooms. In exchange for their work on the school the Catholic charity CARITAS gives the peasants U.S. Food for Peace donations, which is a great incentive. The new five-year school will greatly improve their chances of finishing their primary education because, until now, this usually has meant living away from home, paying one of the merchants of Ocongate room and board and working in their house as a servant. Very few boys do this, and none of the girls study beyond the second grade because their parents want them to work as shepherds. While it will be easier now for everybody to complete primary school, great obstacles still prevent students from Lauramarca from going on to secondary school because the nearest Colegio Nacional is in the provincial capital, Urcos, which is four hours over the mountains by bus or truck."

One of the striking things about the current educational expansion in Peru is how many people from backward rural areas manage to cross these geographic and economic barriers to continue their education. In the sierra this usually means Indian boys leaving their community for the provincial or departmental capital to study secondary school, living in hovels on rations of corn and potatoes sent from their homes. In the slums of Lima this means parents who earn less than \$2 daily spending their weekends building new classrooms and schools to accommodate mushrooming enrollments, then purchasing equipment for these buildings and paying teachers' salaries from their own pockets. In the Department of Cuzco, where population has been rising by 1.3 per cent over the past three decades, school enrollments have been increasing at nearly four times that rate in the same period, exceeding 14 per cent per year during the 1961-1966 climax of this expansion.⁹ Between 1940 and 1972 the population of the city of Cuzco tripled, from 40,000 to 120,000, and the contribution of the educational impulse to this growth is not hard to see. In 1956 there were 1,567 adults studying primary school at night, while there were no secondary night study facilities and the University of Cuzco had an enrollment of about 800 students. By 1973 there were 6,545 students at the university, while there were roughly 10,000 adults enrolled in primary and secondary classes at night. In other



A peasant literacy class in Piçac, Cuzco, 1963.

words, about half of Cuzco's population in the 15-30 age group—the largest migratory cohort—were studying at night or in the university.¹⁰

The Colegio de Ciencias, founded by Simón Bolívar in 1825, stands on a broad plaza in the center of Cuzco next to the great colonial church of San Francisco. At night the interior patio of the Colegio somberly resembles a prison yard of one of the larger state penitentiaries in the United States: shadowy figures scurry through the cold across the yard from nowhere to nowhere, while teachers and students huddle in overcoats in dimly-lit classrooms of the four-story building. In one of these classrooms I met Gilberto Cardenas, aged 19, a peasant from Acomayo Province who has been studying in Cuzco for the past three years while working in a bakery. "I sleep in the bakery and work there from 7 A.M. to 7 P.M., and then attend class at night," he said. "They pay me 300 sols (\$7) per month, plus room and board. My father has only one hectare of land, but he manages to send potatoes and *chuño* (dehydrated potato) to his four

sons who are studying here in Cuzco. Two of my brothers are studying in the Faculty of Education at the University, and another brother and myself are studying at night here in the Colegio de Ciencias. I want to finish my secondary education so I can join the Civil Guard (national police), which would pay 8,000 sols (\$180) a month." According to one of his teachers, there are now 1,500 pupils studying at night at the Colegio, one-fourth more than last year and half again as many as in 1972. "Enrollment would increase even more rapidly if we had the facilities. All these young people believe that education is the only means of advancement, though roughly three-fourths drop out before finishing."

Recently I visited a night primary school on the Avenida Túpac Amaru in the Pueblo Joven (*barriada*, or squatter settlement) of Collique on the desert hills outside Lima. There several hundred adults studied by the light of kerosene lamps in the bleak classrooms of the Fè y Alegría school, which functioned almost continuously from 8 A.M. to 10 P.M. in different shifts. Among those studying there was Victor Mamani Cutunta, a 20-year-old former hacienda serf from the district of San Jerónimo near Cuzco. In the course of a taped classroom discussion of why the *barriada* dwellers made such sacrifices to study at night, Mamani explained in his halting, softspoken way: "I come here to learn to read a little more and to defend my rights and not to be deceived year after year. Because if one goes out looking for work, the boss asks how much schooling you've had and whether you know how to read. He asks for papers, documents, and if you're lacking these things he treats you like garbage, saying this *cholo* (Indian converting to Hispanic culture) doesn't even know how to read. So we all must know how to read to defend our rights. Otherwise we are fooled and exploited like we were in Cuzco, where the *hacendado* was the owner of everything and ruled the lives of 300 or 400 persons. The *hacendado* treated them like slaves and did not want them to study, because if they studied they would awaken and disappear from his hacienda. My parents are still there on the hacienda, because they never learned a single letter and speak only Quechua. Most people there worked for the *hacendado*, so that one person could live from the labor of those beneath him. Here in Lima one can go to school and learn what the teacher has to teach. Little by little one begins to understand. Then one can go to any city or town to

find work, because one knows his rights and how to defend himself. Until my brother brought me to Lima two years ago I never had been to school and didn't know how to read. The *hacendado* had taken us to a plantation he had in the jungle region of Madre de Diós in the Amazon basin, where it rained a lot and where we cultivated rice and yuca. The *hacendados* of Cuzco often had plantations in the jungle as well. Because there were no roads to Madre de Diós, the *hacendado* had to take his peons there by airplane. My brother had to fight hard to get me out of there."

II

The wastage and desperation of Peru's educational expansion has provoked harsh and anguished judgments over the years. In his 1897 message to Congress, at a time when only one in every 40 Peruvians had access to public education, President Nicolás de Piérola, somberly observed: "Primary instruction is insufficient, badly done and disproportionate to the great expense it imposes on us."¹¹ Seven decades later, after enrollments in the public schools had multiplied forty-fold in one of the great educational expansions of modern times, bringing one in every four Peruvians into some form of publicly-sponsored classroom study, the Education Reform Commission of Peru's "Revolutionary Government" of generals and colonels was equally caustic in a 1970 report that became a best-seller in the bookstalls of Lima:

A system that in 1967 spent 4.8 per cent of our GNP—one of the highest percentages in Latin America—and that managed to graduate from secondary school only 12 of every 100 pupils that enrolled in Transition (kindergarten) shows faults and distortions so deep that they must be examined carefully...these enormous outlays for education have not become reproductive investments, but have largely been wasted and contribute only weakly to the purpose pursued.¹²

While the expansion of the school population has been most dramatic since 1957, it often is forgotten that enrollments have been increasing throughout this century at an overall geometric rate of 5.4 per cent annually, nearly triple the growth rate of the population as a whole.¹³ (Appendices II and III

examine the difficulties of maintaining or expanding present enrollment rates if population continues to multiply as in the 1960s.) Meanwhile, education's share of Peru's public budget rose from 2.9 per cent in 1900 to 30 per cent in 1966.¹⁴ The Education Reform Commission—composed of educators from within and outside the public system—noted that during the 1958-1968 decade the number of primary school pupils nearly doubled and those in secondary and university classrooms more than tripled. Meanwhile, the dropout rate declined from 95 per cent in the 1950s to 87 per cent in 1967 to 75 per cent in 1973, leading the Commission to observe that the gains in keeping primary pupils in school have “provoked an upward explosion of enrollments in secondary schools and the universities.” Nevertheless, the dropout rate remained so high that the Commission asked: “What kind of educational system do we have that annually casts away from the schools like garbage more than one-third of a million pupils?”

To answer such a question we must go at least as far back as the beginning of the republican period. Like other Latin American constitutions, Peru's constitution of 1823 was a declaration of distant intent as much as one of law, especially in its provisions describing education as a common need to be satisfied by the Republic through the establishment of universities in each departmental capital and primary schools in the smallest inhabited places. Because education was concentrated almost entirely in the hands of the Church in colonial times, a Supreme Decree of 1823 ordered all convents and monasteries to establish free primary schools under the supervision of the bishops, who generally chose to ignore the decree. On April 14, 1825 the Liberator Simón Bolívar, who was dictator in the first years of the Republic, wrote of the “complete abandonment of public education in all the towns of Peru. In none of them are there primary schools, and children grow up in the most absolute ignorance.”¹⁵ In 1847 President Ramón Castilla, one of the ablest executives in Peru's history, told Congress that “public instruction has received all priority consistent with the deficiency of our resources and our conviction of its advantages and benefits. Primary schools have been extended as much as possible, supervising as closely as possible the teachers who run the schools, attended now by pupils from all classes of society.” Castilla went on to say that, despite insufficient revenues, “it is

satisfying for me to inform you that the primary schools of the Republic are attended by 29,942 pupils, which is proportionately much greater than in other countries of South America.”¹⁶

For the rest of the nineteenth century primary school attendance increased annually by 1.8 per cent, nearly double the rate of population growth, reaching 85,000 by 1904 as the population grew from two million in 1850 to about 3.5 million in 1900.¹⁷ From that time on enrollments began to rise in sudden surges, starting with the administration of President José Pardo (1904-1908) when 2,000 primary schools were built in four years and the number of pupils increased from 85,000 to 156,000.¹⁸ During those years of sudden educational expansion, Peru was governed by an export-oriented civilian oligarchy whose motives were perceptively analyzed in 1928 by the prophet of Peruvian Marxism, José Carlos Mariátegui:

The period of economic reorganization by the civilistas, begun in 1895 by the Piérola government, brought a period of revision of the system and methods of instruction. The work of forming a capitalist economy, interrupted by the War of 1879-1884 and its aftermath, was started again, and thus the problem of gradually adapting public education to the needs of economic development was posed. The State, which in times of poverty and error abandoned primary education to the municipalities, resumed this service. With the foundation of the Normal School in Lima the groundwork was laid for public primary education for the people.... This period was characterized by a shift toward the Anglo-Saxon model. The reform of secondary education in 1902 was the first step in that direction. But, limited to only one level of instruction, it was a false step. The civilista regime reestablished by Pierola did not know how to put its educational policy on a sure course. Its intellectuals, educated in a garrulous and swollen verbalism or in a lymphatic and academic erudition, had only the mediocre skills of tintorillos [parasitic scribes who live off Indians].¹⁹

A generation later Jorge Basadre, Peru's leading historian and twice Minister of Education, further developed this view:

In Peru, as in nearly all other Latin American countries in the first decades of this century, the educational policy was to have limited public primary schooling, secondary instruction divided between a small number of public Colegios Nacionales, attended by certain sectors of the middle class, while the greater part of the student population went to private colegios that tended to proliferate and were rather costly. It was an elite system... The country was governed by a coastal aristocracy whose fortune was based, above all, on export agriculture and, in the interior, by the landlords of the sierra. The agrarian-mercantile nature of Peruvian society led her to preserve the old forms of education with a free primary school that bore a middle class spirit and was practically inaccessible to the rural masses; a few secondary schools that were waiting-rooms for the universities that, in turn, were oriented toward the bureaucracy and the liberal professions without concern for industrial and economic development.²⁰

Such a system was based on an early growth that was slow and painful. The Normal School in Lima, whose creation was decreed in 1822, did not begin functioning until 1859 and lasted only 10 years, during which time it had a succession of eight directors and managed to graduate only two teachers. The ministerial decree closing the school spoke of "deeply rooted organizational vices that even today are sustained with excessive pretensions that are difficult if not impossible to combat successfully."²¹ At the same time, education was financed by a crazy patchwork of special taxes, many of which were never collected, on land, incomes, harvests, and goods sold, and there was little discussion of the content and purpose of schooling. "We had as a kind of rest from the tiring task of learning to read the lessons from mural charts on which they taught us the different geographical features and the main units of the metric system," José Antonio Encinas, one of Peru's leading educational philosophers, recalled of his school days in Puno after the War of the Pacific. "All we did was repeat what the teacher said. We had no idea of the value, meaning or use of these figures... The most monotonous of our classroom activities was to memorize the tables of adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing. In sing-song fashion we repeated from memory the four tables

without any practical application."²² After becoming a teacher in his native Puno, Encinas observed that the government in Lima "obeyed the recommendations of provincial bosses and sent as Inspectors of Instruction... people of doubtful background and an absolute lack of pedagogical knowledge: lawyers without clients, former Sub-Prefects and police chiefs, politicians' bodyguards. All this social garbage served the Civilist Party in the transcendental mission of reforming public education."²³ During an intense parliamentary debate in 1917 over the hiring of more school inspectors, one Deputy said: "A Minister of Public Instruction in Peru is truly a Prometheus chained to a peak, a toy of the politicians who make him choose between his chains and the precipice. We Congressmen are used to considering all functionaries in Education in our respective provinces as being dependent on our choice and subject to our approval." In the same debate another Deputy added: "Meddling of the politicians has reached the point that some have arranged the appointment of the majordomos of their haciendas as school inspectors and then received the salaries of these majordomos under power of attorney."²⁴

The fitful, explosive growth of schooling in this century curiously coincides with periods of civilian rather than military rule. The decades in which enrollments have risen sharply—the 1920s, the 1940s, and 1960s—have also been periods of economic expansion under civilian presidents, while the military coups of 1930, 1948, and 1968 all came during economic crises that dictated both fiscal retrenchment and a slowdown in the rate of enrollment. Also, military rulers have been much less skillful than civilian politicians in dealing with such concomitants of educational expansion as student uprisings and the growing size and belligerency of teachers' organizations. Nevertheless, under both military and civilian rule the radical rise in school enrollments has been seen as part of a redistribution both of wealth and political rights that is reaching into the most remote areas of a nation deeply divided by geographical, racial, and cultural barriers.

According to Professor Shane Hunt of Princeton University, a leading analyst and historian of the Peruvian economy,

... a look at the evolving composition of Peruvian expenditure shows that government's expanding share [of GNP] has

indeed been associated with increasing redistributive impact, through the growing importance of education and health expenditure.... It should be noted that this educational expansion is not merely the reflection of an upward drift in expenditure common to all poor countries. Although educational expansion has taken place elsewhere, nevertheless the Peruvian expansion was extraordinary, so that by 1963 it was devoting a larger share of GNP to education than was any other Latin American country.... It is here in education that we see most clearly the pressures on the government budget for allocating a greater share of political and economic output to groups newly arrived in the political arena. Whether these groups be residents of provincial towns or new migrants to Lima, perhaps their first and strongest demand of government is education for their children. Education is a derived demand, however; the primary demand is for occupational advancement, and so it is that the expansion of educational expenditure under [President Fernando] Belaunde (1963-1968) has had as its purpose the expansion of employment and income for prospective teachers as much as the expansion of educational opportunity for children.²⁵

Between 1960 and 1968 the number of Peruvian universities rose from seven to 33 and the students enrolled in university teacher-training programs multiplied fivefold, from 6,381 to 31,953.²⁶ Normal school enrollments grew seventeenfold, from 1,017 in 1956 to 17,590 in 1967; and the number of normal schools, public and private, rose from 14 to 111 in the same 11-year period. A young professor of education at the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho, whose arrest with 37 other "extremists" in the battle over the gratuity of secondary education set off the bloody Huanta and Ayacucho uprisings of June 1969, told me: "A professional degree in Peru today has become what a title of nobility was in colonial times. In the past a poor family would make incredible sacrifices so their sons could become priests or army officers to give the family some social and economic status. Now the sons and daughters of the same kinds of families swell the enrollments of the universities, with the poorest and least-qualified entering the teacher-training programs. But there are so many education graduates nowadays that many of them cannot

find teaching jobs, or if they find one it usually is in the kind of poor rural area from which they've been trying to escape." In the words of a recent Education Ministry study:

The normal schools and the universities are preparing future teachers without taking into account our educational needs. Although we have only 600,000 pupils in secondary schools and three million in primary, the universities have prepared 24 programs for secondary teachers and only nine for primary instruction, with 23,000 students being trained to be secondary teachers and only 2,700 preparing for primary teaching...in total disregard of national reality.... The result of this mad action of the normal schools and universities is to cast into the labor market thousands of young people who don't find jobs. The secondary teacher-training programs graduate about 5,200 pupils annually to meet a demand of about 1,000 new secondary teachers each year.... In primary schools there is the opposite situation: a relative scarcity of teachers, not so much for a lack of graduates as their refusal to work in the zones where they are most needed, forcing the Ministry to appoint primary school teachers without degrees or professional studies.... The curriculum is characterized by an excess of individual subjects to be learned by rote memory.... The result is a deficient preparation of teachers, not merely deficient in the special subject matter and excellent or good in methodology, but deficient in both.²⁷

The enormous educational expansion of recent years has failed to change the image of the rural school and teacher. In 1953 the luxuriously financed Cornell University project in applied anthropology at the Vicos hacienda, in the Callejón de Huaylas in the Department of Ancash, built a large schoolhouse with six classrooms, a library, and offices; the next year an even larger building was completed that contained an auditorium, kitchen, refectory, and carpentry and metal-working shops, giving the Vicos Indians—who a few years before were hacienda serfs—"primary education facilities superior to those of the Spanish-speaking towns of the area."²⁸ In a book analyzing the educational experience at Vicos over the next decade, the Peruvian anthropologist Mario C.

Vazquez, one of the initiators of the project, reported that between 1952 and 1959, the Vicos school functioned most in the nine-month Peruvian school year (April to December) in 1959, when it was open for 151 days, although the average attendance of the school's nine teachers was only 114 days, or 12.5 days per month. "Inasmuch as the absenteeism of teachers encourages the absenteeism and desertion of pupils, it is enough to say that the best teachers come to school from Monday to Friday, while those called 'tourists' come only two or three days per week or only in the mornings.... In many cases the reports of class attendance of pupils in each school are adulterated according to the teacher's interest."²⁹ "The routine of the teachers is: arrival at Vicos on Mondays between 7 and 10 A.M., some on bicycles and others on foot from the nearby town of Macará, where the bus brings them. They come with the idea of staying in Vicos until 3 P.M. Friday, but the majority return to their homes two or three times in the week, usually after mid-day. This situation never could be controlled by the school director, because he does the same. Those who remain in Vicos have to prepare their food themselves. Only one teacher stays there with his family."³⁰ During a typical school day that stretches from 9 A.M. to 5 P.M., only about four hours are spent in classroom study and the rest in schoolyard recreation and military formations. (An hour-by-hour account by Vazquez of a school day at Vicos is reproduced as Appendix I.)

Despite such deficiencies education's share of Peru's GNP doubled between 1960 and 1966, with teachers' salaries absorbing 95 per cent of the education budget. This dramatic rechanneling of Peru's economic surplus into the school system reflected the growing political power of teachers in a narrowly based electoral democracy (only literates can vote) to the degree that "expanding educational expenditure was more a response to demands of teachers than of the families of school children."³¹ According to Hunt,

Most of this increase originated in the now-famous Law 15215, which decreed a 100 per cent increase in all teachers' salaries, to be provided in four annual steps of 25 per cent each, a great expansion of teacher training facilities, and the guarantee of a job with the government for every newly-graduating teacher. This extraordinary law provoked hardly any opposition when it was

introduced in Congress in 1964, so eager were all political parties to look good before so large and influential a block of voters, despite the fact that the fiscal planning required for implementing the law was, to say the least, inadequate. Within two years this fiscal commitment, among others, provoked an economic crisis from which Peru has not yet fully recovered. The last two of the four 25 per cent increments were cancelled as was the commitment to hire all teachers college graduates.... By 1968, the government needed fewer than 2,000 new teachers, but the teachers colleges were graduating 9,000. It hardly needs saying that in previous decades, particularly before World War II, it was never necessary to make such fiscal commitments in order to secure the support of public school teachers.³²

With the large and increasingly militant teachers' organizations under the control of the opposition APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) party at the time Law 15215 was passed, the Belaunde regime skillfully maneuvered to divide the teachers' movement into anti-APRA and pro-APRA unions, thus reducing the political impact of the cancellation of the two 25 per cent pay raises scheduled for 1967 and 1968. According to an APRA union leader, "the Educational Command of Acción Popular (Belaunde's party)... had already given orders to destroy our union, forming parallel *sindicatos* in all the provinces of Peru" with the help of Education Ministry officials.³³ The teachers struck unsuccessfully in April and May 1967 to have their pay raises restored. However, the fiscal burden and inflationary pressures generated by the raises already granted combined with a mounting public debt and trade deficit to force a 40 per cent devaluation of the Peruvian sol later that year. Meanwhile, with the parliamentary power of censuring cabinet ministers relentlessly wielded by the opposition majority, the Ministry of Education had become such a political battlefield that the tottering Belaunde regime went through eight Ministers of Education before being ousted itself by a military coup in October 1968.

III

The educational expansion and the political battles it generated were profoundly part of some

extraordinary transformations in Peruvian society that reached their climax in the 1960s. A wave of peasant rebellions and land invasions in the southern and central sierra, beginning with the 1957-58 uprisings at Lauramarca and the La Convención Valley in Cuzco Department,³⁴ hastened major land reform initiatives in 1964 and 1969, as well as a series of failed Castroite guerrilla movements in the mid-1960s.³⁵ In the course of these uprisings and reforms traditional Indian serfdom was abolished by law in the Andes. However, the intensified political activity in the countryside generated debilitating controversies and divisions within the Left, beginning with the split of the Peruvian Communist Party in 1965 into Maoist and Muscovite factions. The Maoists, while dividing themselves into what are today four different pro-Chinese parties, were quick to win control over the student organizations and administrative machinery of Peru's principal universities.³⁶ This was especially true in the teacher-training programs; the Maoists also took over the disillusioned teachers' union movement in the wake of the 1968 coup (when the military froze the pay of all public employees but raised their own salaries.)

Accompanying the expansion and political radicalization of the educational establishment was the acceleration of the urbanization process in the 1960s. While 35.4 per cent of Peru's population (2.2 million of 6.2 million) lived in "urban areas" in 1940—with 14.3 per cent (888,433) in cities of at least 20,000 inhabitants—this proportion had increased markedly by the 1961 census, which showed an annual geometric increase of 3.7 per cent in the general urban population to 4.7 million, or 47.4 per cent of a total of 9.9 million, (while the population in cities over 20,000 rose by 4.8 per cent annually to nearly 2.4 million, or 24 per cent of the total). After 1961 this process of urban concentration speeded up considerably. By 1972 the population in major towns and cities had more than doubled to nearly 5.5 million, reflecting an annual increase of 6.7 per cent, while the general urban population grew by 5.1 per cent per year to more than eight million, or nearly 60 per cent of the 13.5 million Peruvians counted. Curiously, the Law 15215, which both raised teachers' salaries and reduced the wage differentials between those teaching in urban and rural areas, played its role in the rush toward the towns and cities as it "greatly worsened the flight of teachers from rural areas." According to Rolland Paulston, a member of the

Columbia University Teachers College advisory mission to the Education Ministry in the 1960s:

Before 15215, rural teachers in nuclear and one-teacher schools were not eligible to teach in the urban public schools. After 1964, when all teachers were placed on the same pay schedule, teachers of rural schools became eligible to teach wherever they could find a job, and the small salary differential for rural service provided by 15215 has often proved to be too little to attract and hold trained teachers in rural areas of the highlands and jungle.³⁷

The flight of qualified teachers to the cities heightened the incentive for peasants to follow them to urban areas in search of educational advantages.

While Peru's educational expansion may be viewed as both costly and unproductive by many "experts" and outsiders, progress through schooling has been the focus of so much hope among the overwhelming majority of Peruvians that any attempt at retrenchment has proven both difficult and politically dangerous. After the APRA-controlled Congress passed law after law in the late 1950s and 1960s ordering creation of normal schools in designated towns to meet the requests of specific political constituencies, any attempt to close them later met with fierce local resistance. "So many normal schools were created in small towns for political reasons that many of them lack teachers, equipment, and their own building," a former director of the normal school in the town of Huanta in the Andean Department of Ayacucho told me in 1970. "Many of the staff are appointed because they are relatives and friends of Congressmen, and the Department of Ayacucho now has 2,000 normal school graduates without jobs. In the Huanta normal school there are only 134 students this year, but when we tried to close it there were tremendous pressures on the Ministry through memorandums to Lima, a town meeting, speeches, and proclamations. The head of the parents' association, an APRA leader, refused to turn over the furniture and equipment to Ministry officials when they tried to close the school, which was operating in rented space. The normal school is still functioning." According to a United Nations study, this is a general educational problem in Latin America:

Reforms that seem to threaten the interests of any specialized group of teachers or administrators are resisted, usually through political channels. At the same time, efforts to rationalize the expansion of the educational systems are countered by continual pressure for special programs and new local institutions, often well-meant and desirable in themselves but unrelated to priorities and in practice contributing mainly to the creation of new jobs and the complication of the administrative apparatus. The present proliferation of new universities and specialized schools in response to local or sectoral initiatives, without consideration of the objectives of training or the availability of qualified staff, material resources and students, is one important facet of the problem.³⁸

The town of Huanta provided another example of the political dangers of educational retrenchment in the first months of the present "Revolutionary Government" of generals and colonels, when the new military regime in its now-famous Decree 006 announced on the eve of the opening of the 1969 school year that any secondary school

student failing one course or more would have to pay a monthly tuition of 100 sols (\$2.50). Because most students fail at least one course (they are allowed three failures before losing the year), the new law, in effect, meant the abolition of the gratuity of public secondary education, in which enrollments have been expanding astronomically in the 15 years since 1957 at an annual average rate of 14.5 per cent. Because most students and their families live precariously close to the subsistence level, the proclamation of Decree-Law 006 was followed by a series of student uprisings, backed by parents' and peasants' organizations, in most of the important towns of the sierra: Tarma, Jauja, Huancaayo, Huanta, Ayacucho, Andahuaylas, Abancay, and Cuzco. In many of these towns, the local leadership, or "notables," were members of the opposition APRA that was blocked in its bid for the presidency by the military coup a few months before; the student and peasant movements were under leftist influence. The most violent of these 1969 uprisings occurred in Huanta and Ayacucho, the two main towns of the Department of Ayacucho, one of the poorest regions of the Andes where the expansion of public education has altered the face of poverty dramatically.

~~~~~

#### NOTES

1. Pronounced Maylma.
2. In a detailed statistical survey of the Peruvian school system carried out in 1956, on the eve of the dramatic educational expansion of the past two decades, the Ministry of Education found that half the primary school pupils lacked classroom seats. While this situation has improved somewhat, it is still a major problem in many schools in the sierra. See Ministry of Education, *Inventario de la Realidad Educativa del Perú*, Lima, 1957, Vol. I, p. 204. This four-volume study henceforth will be referred to as *Inventario*.
3. The impact of the War of the Pacific, in which both Peru and Bolivia lost large swaths of nitrate-rich coastal lands to Chile, on the Peruvian school system is eloquently described by José Antonio Encinas, one of Peru's leading educational philosophers, in an account of his experience as a teacher in his native Puno at the turn of the century: "The country, spiritually destroyed, could only seek refuge in the primary school. It needed a point of support to move new energies and prepare for revenge. This need gave the school a chauvinist imprint. All school life focused on the war. Children are taught a warlike spirit. Hatred for Chile is a new moral maxim. The episodes of the war become the outstanding features of the daily school routine. The names of Grau, Bolognesi, Leoncio Prado excite the children's imagination. The military incidents of the war dwarf all other cultural elements." Besides wresting the coastal lands of Arica from Peru, Chilean armies invaded and occupied large areas of the Peruvian coast and sierra, including Lima. See Encinas, *Un Ensayo de la Escuela Nueva en el Perú* (Second Edition), Lima: Festival del Libro Puneño, 1959, Vol. I, p. 86.
4. The broad Peruvian census definition of "urban area" is any contiguous grouping of at least 100 houses, or any district capital (the smallest seat of public administration) with fewer houses.
5. Bernard Mishkin, "The Contemporary Quechua," in Julian Steward, ed., *Handbook of South American Indians. Vol. II: The Andean Civilizations*, Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1946, p. 461.

6. For a historical sketch of the conflicts at Lauramarca through the early stages of land reform, see my "The Master Is Dead," in *Dissent*, June 1971, pp. 281-320.
7. Alencastre's report, a typescript copy of which I recently obtained in Cuzco, has never been published. For the account of another visitor to Lauramarca in this period, see Richard W. Patch, *The Indian Emergence in Cuzco* [RWP-8-'58], American Universities Field Staff Reports, West Coast South America Series, Vol. V, No. 9, 1958.
8. Acronym meaning *Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social*, or National Support System for Social Mobilization.
9. For an illustration of the enrollment growth rates in the 1961-1966 period, exceeding 10 per cent annually in virtually every department of the sierra, see the map in Martha Bargar and Peter Gardiner, *Population of Peru: estimates and Projections 1962-2002*, Washington: U.S. Census Bureau Demographic Reports for Foreign Countries Series P-96 No. 4, 1971, p. 24. The enrollment growth rate for Cuzco Department in this period was 14.6 per cent, the highest in the sierra.
10. In addition to the *Inventario, op. cit.*, the main sources of enrollment statistics for these reports are the Ministry of Education's statistical yearbooks for 1967 and 1973, as well as the *Boletín Estadístico No. 3* (1972) of the Education Ministry's Fifth Region, embracing the departments of Cuzco, Apurímac, and Madre de Dios. Also the Peruvian Government's statistical yearbook (in most years called *Anuario Estadístico*) for 1942, 1954, 1960, 1961, 1964, and 1969. University enrollment data is based mainly on CONUP (Consejo Nacional de la Universidad Peruana), *Población Matriculada según Universidades, Ramas, y Especialidades de Estudio y Sexo*. Lima, 1970.
11. Quoted in Jorge Basadre, *Historia de la República del Perú* (Sixth Edition), Lima: Editorial Universitaria, 1968, Vol. XV, p. 8.
12. Ministry of Education, *Reforma de la Educación Peruana: Informe General*, Lima, 1970, pp. 15-16. Heretofore referred to as *Informe*.
13. These growth rates are based on enrollments of 87,000 in 1904 and 3,265,000 in 1973 for all public primary and secondary schools and universities. During the same period, population grew at roughly 1.9 per cent annually from about 3.5 million in 1900 to 13.5 million in 1972.
14. For a revealing statistical series, see Shane J. Hunt, *Distribution, Growth and Government Economic Behavior in Peru*. Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Development Research Project: Discussion Paper No. 7 (mimeographed), 1969, p. 31.
15. Basadre, I, 238.
16. *Ibid.*, III, 248.
17. See CEPD (Centro de Estudios de Población y Desarrollo), *Informe Demográfico del Perú*, Lima, 1972. P. 57.
18. Frederick B. Pike, *The Modern History of Peru*, New York: Praeger, 1967, p. 192.
19. Mariátegui, *Siete Ensayos de Interpretación de la Realidad Peruana*, Havana: Casa de las Americas, 1963, p. 98. This classic has gone through several editions, including an English version published recently by the University of Texas Press.
20. Basadre, XV, 98.
21. Basadre, VI, 255.
22. Encinas, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 100.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
24. Basadre, XV, p. 61.
25. Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
26. CONUP (Consejo Nacional de la Universidad Peruana), *Población Matriculada según Universidades, Ramas y Especialidades de Estudio y Sexo*, Statistical Bulletin No. 4, Lima, 1970, p. 10.
27. *Comisión de Estudio de la Situación del Magisterio: Informe General*, Lima, 1972, p. 10. (mimeographed).
28. From Richard W. Patch, *An Hacienda Becomes a Community* [RWP-2-'57], American Universities Field Staff Report, West Coast South America Series, Vol. IV, No. 11, 1957, p. 8. For other Reports on the progress of the project, see *Life in a Peruvian Indian Community* [RWP-1-'62], West Coast South America Series, Vol. IX, No. 1, 1962, and *Vicos and the Peace Corps* [RWP-1-'64], West Coast South America Series, Vol. XI, No. 2, 1964. For an account by the project director, see Allan R. Holmberg, "Changing Community Attitudes and Values in Peru: A Case Study in Guided Change," in *Social Change in Latin America Today*, New York: Vintage Books, 1960, pp. 63-108.

29. From Mario C. Vazquez, *Educación Rural en el Callejón de Huaylas: Vicos*. Lima: Estudios Andinos, 1965, p. 43.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

31. Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

33. Cristobal D. Bustos Chavez, *Experiencias Sindicales y Pedagógicas del Magisterio Peruano*. Lima, 1969. p. 199. This is the best available source of documents on the teachers' union movement through 1968.

34. For a firsthand account of these uprisings in the Cuzco region, see my "Letter from Peru," in *Commentary*, June 1964. A longer Spanish version of the same essay, "La Semillas de la Revolución," was published in the magazine *Política*, No. 37, Caracas, January 1965.

35. During 1965-66 I spent about five months in the sierra and jungle reporting on the Peruvian land reform and guerrilla movements of the mid-1960s. See my "A Red Insurgency Jolts Latin America," *The Wall Street Journal* (editorial page), November 8, 1965; "Mao-type War in the Andes," *The Observer* (London), January 16, 1966; "Peru's Misfired Guerrilla Campaign," *The Reporter*, January 26, 1967; "Revolution Without Revolutionaries," *The Nation*, August 22, 1966; "More Land than Law for Latins," *The Economist*,

June 4, 1966; "Elusive Land Reform," *The Wall Street Journal* (editorial page), August 18, 1966. For other accounts of the guerrilla insurrection see the bibliography in Leon G. Campbell, "The Historiography of the Peruvian Guerrilla Movement, 1960-65," *Latin American Research Review*, Spring 1973.

36. For a profile of the political machine at the University of Cuzco, see my "With Mao in the Mountains," *The Economist*, January 29, 1966. The Maoist movement so far has been divided into these factions: *Bandera Roja* (Red Flag), formed after original split with PCP in 1965, proclaims armed struggle in the countryside; *Patria Rojo* (Red Fatherland), split away from *Bandera Roja* in 1972 and based mainly in the universities; *Sotomayoristas*, another splintering from *Bandera Roja*, led by José Sotomayor, a former Central Committee member of PCP and *Bandera Roja*; *Vanguardia Revolucionaria* (VR), formed in Paris in 1965, which has had two Trotskyite offshoots: *Liga Comunista* and *Partido Obrero Marxista Revolucionario*, the latter led by Ricardo Napurri, who lives in Paris.

37. From Rolland G. Paulston, *Society, Schools and Progress in Peru*, New York and Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1971, p. 221.

38. ECLA (United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America), *Education, Human Resources and Development in Latin America*, New York, 1968, p. 64.



## APPENDIX I

### A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A RURAL SCHOOL (1959)

(From Mario C. Vazquez, *Educacion Rural en el Callejon de Huaylas: Vicos*. Lima: Editorial Estudios Andinos, 1965. Pp. 73-78.)

8:00 A.M. The pupils begin to arrive in the plaza of Vicos, where they begin to play with balls, hoops, or just watch each other. Some arrive clean and others arrive without even washing their face in the morning.

8:30 The janitor rings the bell. The pupils stop playing and rush to the faucets or to the brook that runs beside the school. They quickly wet their hands, face and (sometimes) their feet, and comb themselves as they rush toward the place of military formation.

9:00 The bell rings again. The pupils assemble in front of the school and form lines in order of size, pushing and shoving each other. The boys and girls form separate lines. The teachers arrive one by one and sit on the stone blocks in front of the pupils. The teacher on duty, directing the formation, gives the military commands such as "attention," "left-face," and "rest," etc.



Evening formation at the school of Maranpaki sector of Hacienda Lauramarca, Cuzco, 1974. In background at right is the snowy peak of Mount Ausanecate, 21,000 feet.

- 9:10 The teacher on duty, with the director's help, makes recommendations to the pupils about cleanliness, providing firewood to the school kitchen, punctuality, etc. Some pupils continue to arrive late. The teacher leads the singing of the national anthem and some other school song. Again, the military commands. The pupils march, single-file, into the corridor, where they break formation and rush to the classrooms.
- 9:30 The teachers form a group in the corridor and, at the director's initiative, gossip about the incidents of the previous night or the latest news from the town of Carhuaz.
- 9:45 The teachers enter their respective classrooms and the noise ends. Some pass around an attendance list, while others begin teaching or leading songs.
- 10:10 The bell rings, announcing the recreation period. The teachers form another group and continue their interrupted conversation, indifferent to the children's activities. The boys exuberantly play with a small ball on the football field while others wrestle. The girls form groups and watch. Some pupils go to the kitchen to find out the menu.

- 10:30 The bell rings and the pupils return to the classrooms, followed by the teachers.
- 11:10 The bell rings for another recreation period. Some teachers form groups again, while others go to their rooms. The children play as before.
- 11:25 The bell rings for the end of the second recess.
- 11:30 Lessons resume in all the classrooms. Some pupils belatedly enter the classes while others leave with permission to wash their hands or perform some bodily function.
- 11:40 The kindergarten children leave their classrooms and begin to play.
- 12 noon The bell announces the noonday rest. The teachers return to their private rooms, while some children resume their play and others wait outside the lunch room.
- 12:15P.M. The teacher on duty orders the children into formation again after they have washed their hands and moistened their hair. The lunchroom attendant passes around an attendance list while the teacher maintains discipline before they all go to eat. Two pupils carry the plates to each child's place.
- 1:00 Lunch over, the teacher on duty returns to his house. The pupils wash their plates and give them to the cook. Then they play again.
- 1:30 The bell rings, announcing "clean-up." The pupils begin to form groups on the playing field.
- 1:50 The teacher on duty blows his whistle to again announce "clean-up" before the afternoon line-up.
- 2:00 The bell rings. Another military formation, this time more brief and informal. The pupils go to the classrooms. The teachers, one by one, follow them.
- 2:15 Classes begin again in the first three grades. The workshop teachers go with pupils to the blacksmith's shop or the fields to cultivate. The director goes to his office to talk with a parent and the other teacher goes back to his house.
- 3:30 The bell rings for another recess. The pupils go to the ballfield and corridors, except those working in the orchard.
- 4:00 The bell rings and the classes resume.
- 5:00 The bell rings again. The pupils assemble for the last formation. The director urges punctuality and a return to the pupils' homes without delays along the way.
- 5:10 Most of the pupils return home, but one group remains to play football with the evening school pupils. The teachers go to their homes to prepare tea.
- 5:30 The evening school's director arrives, and orders his pupils to enter the classroom. Most of them go to the faucets to wash their hands and faces.

This routine was almost exactly the same between 1954 and 1959, save for Mondays, Thursdays, and Fridays: Mondays, because the teachers were either absent or arrived late; Thursdays, because they had "sports afternoon" in which some teachers played football with the pupils from 2:30 to 4 P.M.; Fridays, because classes ended at 3:30 P.M. The teacher on duty dismissed the pupils until the following Monday.

## APPENDIX II

Despite Peru's recent achievement in expanding public education, it will be hard to maintain or expand present enrollment rates if population continues to multiply as in the 1960s. According to estimates and projections of Peru's population growth issued by the U.S. Census Bureau in 1971, four different levels of educational demand are foreseen for the rest of this century. These vary according to constant fertility from 1962 to 2002 (Series A), moderately declining fertility (Series B), rapidly declining fertility (Series C), and very rapidly declining fertility (Series D). Because the Census Bureau sees the Series C and D scenarios as highly unlikely in the absence of war, plague, famine, or some other manmade or natural calamity, we shall concentrate on the more predictable alternatives of constant and moderately declining fertility:<sup>1</sup>

*SERIES A:* The crude birthrate would decline slightly from 46.5 per 1,000 in 1962 to level off at 41.5 after 1995, while the crude death rate would drop by more than two-thirds in the same period, from 17.0 in 1962 to 5.2 in 2001, producing a rise in the rate of natural increase from 2.9% in 1962 to 3.6% in 2001. Peru's population thus would double in the 21 years between 1968 and 1989 and reach 37.2 million by the end of the century, or triple the population estimated for 1968. Between 1962 and 2002 the number of preschool children (under six years) would grow at 3.6% annually, quadrupling from 2.1 to 8.6 million. Children of primary and secondary school age would multiply in similar proportions. To achieve universal primary school enrollment under the constant fertility projections of Series A, places would have to be found for 4.8 million more children by 2002, beyond the 2.3 million who were in school in 1967, while 141,000 new primary teachers would have to be found in addition to the 57,000 in service in 1965. At the secondary level, projections were made at constant (1961) enrollment rates, covering, at best, 19.5% of all males in the 15-16 year age group, and for the growth needed to achieve the "universal" enrollment prevailing in the United States in 1969, of about 93% of all males and females in the 13-16 age group. These projections are complicated by two factors:

- (1) Because secondary enrollments since 1957 have multiplied at an annual average rate of more than 14%, it is hard to project continued increases on this scale, or any variant therefrom, which at constant growth would achieve universal secondary enrollment long before the end of the century.
- (2) Because the 1961 coverage rate is unrealistically low for today's secondary enrollments, actual enrollments for 1972 (841,000) were nearly 50% more than the 573,000 projected for that year. While the enrollment rate in the primary school age group (6-14) rose by less than one per cent to 72.2% in the 1970-1972 period, secondary enrollments increased by 22.6% in absolute terms, raising overall coverage in the 15-19 age group from 41.5% to 44.9%.

Coverage in the 15-19 age group is distributed among day and night primary schools as well as academic and vocational secondary schools, and there was a significant shift in distribution toward the secondary schools in the 1970-1972 period.<sup>2</sup>

The U.S. Census Bureau's secondary enrollment projections are of little value in absolute terms, because by 1972 the actual enrollment (841,000) had exceeded the "constant" projected enrollment for 1982. Nevertheless, the differential levels of fertility on which the Census Bureau's projections are based, as well as the consequent differences in demand for secondary education, are only expected to appear in enrollments after 1982 because of the lag between birth and entrance into secondary school age. However, in the decades 1982-1992 and 1992-2002, the effects on enrollments of fertility differentials become very substantial, requiring an average yearly enrollment increase of 35,000 under Series A and only 26,000 under Series B in 1982-1992 and 52,000 and 30,000 respectively in the following decade at constant enrollment rates. In the same two decades, the enrollment demands of Series A are respectively 5.0 and 8.5 times the requirements under Series D, the lowest fertility projection.

*SERIES B:* A moderate decline in fertility would result in a doubling of Peru's population over 24 years following 1967, instead of 21 years under Series A, the result of a drop in the crude birthrate from 46.5 in 1962 to 35.8 in 1985 (tending to level off after that), while the crude death rate declines somewhat more slowly than

in Series A, from 17.0 in 1962 to 5.4 in 2001, producing a growth rate of nearly 3.0% at the end of the century. Peru's population would thus be 32.2 million in 2000 (as against 37.2 million in Series A). Instead of quadrupling, as in Series A, the number of children in preschool age would triple over the 40-year period, with roughly similar increases in the 6-11 and 12-16 age groups. "Because of high fertility levels during the late 1950s and the relatively small reductions in fertility estimated for the 1962-1968 period, the rate of growth of the primary school age group (6-11) will remain high, close to 3.5% annually, at least until 1975. By that time there would be 2.6 million children in this age group in any of the series, a substantial increase over the 2.0 million estimated to exist only seven years earlier in 1968. Under Series A, an average growth rate of close to 3.7% would be maintained over the remainder of the projection period, resulting in a total primary school aged population of 6.8 million in 2002, an increase of 163% over the 1975 level. The trends for Series B, C, and D show the effect of declining fertility in this age group. After 1975 the growth rate of the primary school age group slows dramatically in all of these series reaching low points of 2.4% in Series B during 1990-1995, 0.4% in Series C during 1990-1995, and -0.2% in Series D during 1980-1985. Compared to the absolute increase of 4.2 million primary school aged children in Series A between 1975 and 2002, this age group would increase by 2.7 million under Series B, 0.9 million under Series C and only 0.8 million under Series D over the same period of time. The extraordinarily low growth rates in either of the low fertility series (C and D) would give Peru ample opportunity to achieve universal enrollment in this age group and a high quality of primary education by the end of the century."<sup>3</sup> Consequently, declining fertility would have its impact on the economic and human demands of the system for more teachers and schools. At the primary level, where the projections have proven to be more reliable, Peru would need 198,500 teachers and 65,200 schools by 2002 to meet Series A population growth (compared with 57,000 teachers and 18,400 schools in 1965). On the other hand, Series D growth would cut this demand in half, while Series B would reduce it by nearly one-quarter. At the secondary level, "differences between the population series become even more pronounced when improvements in enrollment are considered. Universal enrollment under Series A would require over 300,000 teachers by 2002 just to keep the 1965 student-teacher ratio constant (at 14.6 per teacher) as compared to a total of 163,000 under Series D. This represents an average increase in the number of teachers of from 3.7 to 7.6 thousand each year over the 37-year period from 1965 to 2002...."<sup>4</sup>

- 
1. Martha Bargar and Peter Gardiner, *Population of Peru: Estimates and Projections, 1962-2002*. Washington: U.S. Census Bureau, Demographic Reports for Foreign Countries, 1971, 96 pp.
  2. Ministry of Education, *Plan Operative 1973*. Lima, 1973, p. 11.
  3. Bargar and Gardiner, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
  4. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

## APPENDIX III

TABLE I

Estimated and Projected Population of Preschool Age Children (Under 6 Years) in Peru: Selected Years, 1962 to 2002

(Figures are in thousands and relate to January 1)

| Year                          | Series A | Series B | Series C | Series D |
|-------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Estimates                     |          |          |          |          |
| 1962.....                     | 2,117    | 2,117    | 2,117    | 2,117    |
| 1967.....                     | 2,555    | 2,555    | 2,555    | 2,555    |
| Projections                   |          |          |          |          |
| 1968.....                     | 2,635    | 2,635    | 2,635    | 2,635    |
| 1970.....                     | 2,779    | 2,763    | 2,747    | 2,731    |
| 1975.....                     | 3,260    | 3,101    | 2,942    | 2,783    |
| 1980.....                     | 3,881    | 3,488    | 3,095    | 2,724    |
| 1985.....                     | 4,652    | 3,936    | 3,220    | 2,757    |
| 1990.....                     | 5,559    | 4,432    | 3,279    | 2,958    |
| 1995.....                     | 6,648    | 5,169    | 3,457    | 3,340    |
| 2000.....                     | 7,983    | 6,034    | 3,844    | 3,676    |
| 2002.....                     | 8,599    | 6,402    | 4,010    | 3,781    |
| Average annual percent change |          |          |          |          |
| 1962 to 2002.                 | 3.6      | 2.8      | 1.6      | 1.5      |
| 1962 to 1968.                 | 3.7      | 3.7      | 3.7      | 3.7      |
| 1968 to 1970.                 | 2.7      | 2.4      | 2.1      | 1.8      |
| 1970 to 1975.                 | 3.2      | 2.3      | 1.4      | 0.4      |
| 1975 to 1980.                 | 3.5      | 2.4      | 1.0      | 0.4      |
| 1980 to 1985.                 | 3.7      | 2.4      | 0.8      | 0.2      |
| 1985 to 1990.                 | 3.6      | 2.4      | 0.4      | 1.4      |
| 1990 to 1995.                 | 3.6      | 3.1      | 1.1      | 2.5      |
| 1995 to 2000.                 | 3.7      | 3.1      | 2.1      | 1.9      |
| 2000 to 2002.                 | 3.8      | 3.0      | 2.1      | 1.4      |

Source: International Demographic Statistics Center, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

TABLE II

Estimated and Projected Population of Primary School Age Children (6 Through 11 Years) in Peru: Selected Years, 1961 to 2002

(Figures are in thousands and relate to January 1)

| Year                          | Series A | Series B | Series C | Series D |
|-------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Estimates                     |          |          |          |          |
| 1962.....                     | 1,681    | 1,681    | 1,681    | 1,681    |
| 1967.....                     | 1,930    | 1,930    | 1,930    | 1,930    |
| Projections                   |          |          |          |          |
| 1968.....                     | 1,997    | 1,997    | 1,997    | 1,997    |
| 1970.....                     | 2,173    | 2,173    | 2,173    | 2,173    |
| 1975.....                     | 2,604    | 2,599    | 2,594    | 2,590    |
| 1980.....                     | 3,077    | 2,960    | 2,843    | 2,726    |
| 1985.....                     | 3,690    | 3,355    | 3,021    | 2,694    |
| 1990.....                     | 4,437    | 3,801    | 3,165    | 2,707    |
| 1995.....                     | 5,315    | 4,278    | 3,234    | 2,873    |
| 2000.....                     | 6,362    | 4,965    | 3,376    | 3,234    |
| 2002.....                     | 6,843    | 5,297    | 3,494    | 3,392    |
| Average annual percent change |          |          |          |          |
| 1962 to 2002.                 | 3.6      | 2.9      | 1.8      | 1.8      |
| 1962 to 1968.                 | 2.9      | 2.9      | 2.9      | 2.9      |
| 1968 to 1970.                 | 4.3      | 4.3      | 4.3      | 4.3      |
| 1970 to 1975.                 | 3.7      | 3.6      | 3.6      | 3.6      |
| 1975 to 1980.                 | 3.4      | 2.6      | 1.9      | 1.0      |
| 1980 to 1985.                 | 3.7      | 2.5      | 1.2      | -0.2     |
| 1985 to 1990.                 | 3.8      | 2.5      | 0.9      | 0.1      |
| 1990 to 1995.                 | 3.7      | 2.4      | 0.4      | 1.2      |
| 1995 to 2000.                 | 3.7      | 3.0      | 0.9      | 2.4      |
| 2000 to 2002.                 | 3.7      | 3.3      | 1.7      | 2.4      |

Source: International Demographic Statistics Center, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Source: *Demographic Reports for Foreign Countries*, Series P-96, No. 4 (Prepared under a participating agency service agreement with the Office of Population Agency for International Development), U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.



TABLE III


Estimated and Projected Population of Secondary  
School Age Children (12 Through 16 Years) in Peru:  
Selected Years, 1962 to 2002

(Figures are in thousands and relate to January 1)

| Year          | Series A                      | Series B | Series C | Series D |
|---------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|
|               | Estimates                     |          |          |          |
| 1962.....     | 1,191                         | 1,191    | 1,191    | 1,191    |
| 1967.....     | 1,361                         | 1,361    | 1,361    | 1,361    |
|               | Projections                   |          |          |          |
| 1968.....     | 1,398                         | 1,398    | 1,398    | 1,398    |
| 1970.....     | 1,480                         | 1,480    | 1,480    | 1,480    |
| 1975.....     | 1,745                         | 1,745    | 1,745    | 1,745    |
| 1980.....     | 2,124                         | 2,124    | 2,124    | 2,124    |
| 1985.....     | 2,505                         | 2,424    | 2,343    | 2,262    |
| 1990.....     | 3,006                         | 2,751    | 2,495    | 2,240    |
| 1995.....     | 3,617                         | 3,119    | 2,621    | 2,240    |
| 2000.....     | 4,336                         | 3,508    | 2,681    | 2,364    |
| 2002.....     | 4,659                         | 3,695    | 2,706    | 2,458    |
|               | Average annual percent change |          |          |          |
| 1962 to 2002. | 3.5                           | 2.9      | 2.1      | 1.8      |
| 1962 to 1968. | 2.7                           | 2.7      | 2.7      | 2.7      |
| 1968 to 1970. | 2.9                           | 2.9      | 2.9      | 2.9      |
| 1970 to 1975. | 3.3                           | 3.3      | 3.3      | 3.3      |
| 1975 to 1980. | 4.0                           | 4.0      | 4.0      | 4.0      |
| 1980 to 1985. | 3.4                           | 2.7      | 2.0      | 1.3      |
| 1985 to 1990. | 3.7                           | 2.6      | 1.3      | -0.2     |
| 1990 to 1995. | 3.8                           | 2.5      | 1.0      | 0.0      |
| 1995 to 2000. | 3.7                           | 2.4      | 0.5      | 1.1      |
| 2000 to 2002. | 3.7                           | 2.6      | 0.5      | 2.0      |


Source: International Demographic Statistics  
Center, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

**Figure 1 Estimated and Projected Population of Preschool Age (Under 6 Years) in Peru: 1962 to 2002**




Source: International Demographic Statistics Center, U.S. Bureau of the Census

**Figure 2 Estimated and Projected Population of Primary School Age (6-11 Years) in Peru: 1962 to 2002**



Source: International Demographic Statistics Center, U.S. Bureau of the Census





**TABLE IV Estimated and Projected School Enrollment at the Primary Level for Both Sexes: Selected Years, 1962 to 2002**


(Changing enrollment rates. Figures are in thousands and relate to January 1)

| Years                                   | Series A | Series B | Series C | Series D |
|-----------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| <b>Estimates</b>                        |          |          |          |          |
| 1962.....                               | 1,520    | 1,520    | 1,520    | 1,520    |
| 1967.....                               | 2,313    | 2,313    | 2,313    | 2,313    |
| <b>Projections</b>                      |          |          |          |          |
| 1972.....                               | 2,708    | 2,708    | 2,708    | 2,708    |
| 1977.....                               | 3,181    | 3,158    | 3,135    | 3,112    |
| 1982.....                               | 3,715    | 3,545    | 3,376    | 3,206    |
| 1987.....                               | 4,370    | 3,936    | 3,501    | 3,105    |
| 1992.....                               | 5,153    | 4,352    | 3,552    | 3,066    |
| 1997.....                               | 6,050    | 4,817    | 3,531    | 3,214    |
| 2002.....                               | 7,107    | 5,507    | 3,648    | 3,530    |
| <b>1967 to 2002</b>                     |          |          |          |          |
| Annual growth rate.....(percent)..      | 3.3      | 2.5      | 1.3      | 1.2      |
| Total increment.....(thousands)..       | 4,794    | 3,194    | 1,335    | 1,217    |
| Average yearly increment..(thousands).. | 137      | 91       | 38       | 35       |
| <b>1967 to 1982</b>                     |          |          |          |          |
| Annual growth rate.....(percent)..      | 3.2      | 2.9      | 2.6      | 2.2      |
| Total increment.....(thousands)..       | 1,402    | 1,232    | 1,063    | 893      |
| Average yearly increment..(thousands).. | 93       | 82       | 71       | 60       |
| <b>1982 to 1992</b>                     |          |          |          |          |
| Annual growth rate.....(percent)..      | 3.3      | 2.1      | 0.5      | -0.4     |
| Total increment.....(thousands)..       | 1,438    | 807      | 176      | -140     |
| Average yearly increment..(thousands).. | 144      | 81       | 18       | -14      |
| <b>1992 to 2002</b>                     |          |          |          |          |
| Annual growth rate.....(percent)..      | 3.3      | 2.4      | 0.3      | 0.1      |
| Total increment.....(thousands)..       | 1,954    | 1,155    | 96       | 464      |
| Average yearly increment..(thousands).. | 195      | 116      | 10       | 46       |

Source: International Demographic Statistics Center, U.S. Bureau of the Census




**Figure 6** Estimated and Projected School Enrollment at the Secondary Level in Peru for Both Sexes: 1962 to 2002



<sup>1</sup> Projections assume achievement of enrollment rates for the United States in 1969 by the year 2002.

Source: Projections of the International Demographic Statistics Center, U.S. Bureau of the Census.





# Peru's Education Reform

## Part II: Escape from Poverty

by Norman Gall



### PERU

Huanta Province was the site in 1969 of a peasant uprising when a military government decree appeared to threaten access to free public education, the peasant's escape from poverty. Decree 006 was repealed and the government began a complete restructuring of the educational system based on the rural *nucleo escolar*.

[NG-4-'74]

Fieldstaff Reports

American  
Universities  
Field Staff

*The light of the stars shined on the town. It reflected, not on the garbage in the streets, but instead on the spent doorways of eroded white stone, the discolored tiles of sagging roofs, the sad yellow grasses beside the sewage ditches that ran through the middle of the streets. There was a little light on the white flagstone of the sidewalks; black spaces separated the stones where some had been torn away. In the great silence the profile of the mountains was raised to where the peaks swam in the rivers of stars. The song of the crickets echoed the syncopation of heaven and earth. The voice of the great river reached the town. It seemed to move with deep tenderness the cluster of dying trees languishing in the plaza that was so broad and so dry.*

From José María Arguedas, "Todas Las Sangres" (1964).

Despite the student demonstrations of the previous day, the night of June 20, 1969 in the town of Huanta was quiet as usual, with anemic yellow lightbulbs faintly illuminating the plaza and the principal streets until 10 o'clock. After that hour, the mud streets and the adobe houses swam in deep, shifting shadows for the rest of the night, disturbed by the curses and quarrels of occasional clusters of drunkards and by the whispering movements of Indians from the *puna* who slept in doorways during the night.

Throughout that night and the early hours of Saturday, June 21, the Subprefect of Huanta Province, Octavio Cabrera, was playing cards with Dr. Lazon, the dentist, and the Italian who ran the town's electrical generator. Subprefect Cabrera is a tall man in his early sixties with a leonine head who would appear truly distinguished were it not for his bloodshot eyes and a deeply-wrinkled face racked by alcohol. Related by marriage to a former army chief of staff, Subprefect Cabrera's political connections have made him a 35-year veteran of small-town government offices in the coastal, sierra, and jungle regions of Peru, in places like Huarochiri, Canta, Rioja, Tarapoto, Lucanas, San Miguel, Cangallo and Ayacucho itself. He had been subprefect of Huanta once before in the 1960s. His kidnapping the following day would be the most spectacular event in his long and illustrious career.

The June 1969 uprising in the neighboring towns of Huanta and Ayacucho was the most important popular revolt in Peruvian history associated with the issue of free public education. Coming a few days before the proclamation of a sweeping land reform law by Peru's "Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces" that seized power in October 1968, the Huanta-Ayacucho events showed the new military regime how resistant the Peruvian people

could be to decrees and new political morphologies imposed from above. Not only did this uprising set the tone of the military rulers' frustrating relations with peasants and urban squatters—the social classes whose political loyalties the military hoped to win by decreeing major social reforms—but it also showed the desperation with which any measure would be opposed that threatened access to free public education, the only means of escape from the dead-end poverty and subjection in the sierra that had existed for centuries. It was the new military regime's Decree 006, announced a few months after its seizure of power in October 1968, that threatened to place secondary education beyond the economic reach of many poor students by charging a monthly tuition of 100 soles (\$2.50) for those who failed a course. By appearing to block this means of escape from poverty, the new decree provoked an explosive reaction from the emergent social classes who only recently had gained access to secondary education, and it led to a series of strikes and uprisings in the small towns of the sierra that culminated in the bloody events of Ayacucho and Huanta on June 21-22, 1969.

## I

The town of Huanta was once a *tambo*, or resting place, on the *Camino Real* (Royal Road) of the Incas that follows the course of the Montaro River on the way from Jauja to Cuzco. The sixteenth-century Spanish chronicler, Pedro Cieza de León, wrote that "all these roads are full of caves where men and beasts can take shelter from rain and snow. The natives of this region have their settlements in great sierras,...whose summits are covered with snow nearly all the time. They plant their crops in sheltered spots, such as the mountain valleys. In many of the mountains are great lodes of silver."<sup>1</sup> The caves around Huanta



are in a remarkable ecological zone where "within a radius of 15 miles the varied highland environment includes areas of subtropical desert, thorn-forest grassland, dry thorn forest, humid scrub forest and subarctic tundra." The dryness of the region has permitted the preservation in its caves of recently discovered traces of human life going back 22,000 years, the earliest known remains of men in the New World, chronicling "man's progression from an early hunter to an incipient agriculturalist to a village farmer and finally to the role of a subject of imperial rule."<sup>2</sup> The "Huanta complex" of scrapers, blades, and projectile points goes back 10,000 years to the last glacial advance in the Andes.

While there are no written records left by the preliterate Huari and Inca empires, and only the sketchiest statistical indications have been provided by Spanish crown officials, all evidence points to unrelieved demographic stagnation ever since 1791 when a population of 27,337 for the Province (*partido*) of Huanta was given by the *Guía Política, Eclesiástica y Militar del Perú* (1793).<sup>3</sup> Although the name of the province and town of Huanta is the Quechua word for syphilis, the dryness of the land and its inhospitability to agriculture are reasons enough for the population growth rate of the province over the next two centuries to have been a mere 0.5 per cent per year: from 27,337 in 1791 to 33,165 in 1862 to 50,983 in 1940 to 67,590 in 1972.

While a sharp drop in mortality has led in recent decades to a rise in Peru's population growth rate to more than 3 per cent annually, in backward mountain areas like Huanta this slow increase has been nullified by migration to Lima and to nearby jungle areas. The town of Huanta, the second most important urban center in the Department of Ayacucho, grew only slightly in population (from 4,439 to 7,729) between the censuses of 1940 and 1972, responding but weakly to the national trend of urbanization.

The stagnation of the surrounding countryside is expressed by some comparative indices of social and economic backwardness relating the Department of Ayacucho to the 23 other departments of Peru. According to these indices,<sup>4</sup> Ayacucho had the highest proportion of houses without electricity (96.7%); the second-highest proportion of adult illiteracy (79%) and persons unable to speak Spanish (66%); the second-lowest departmental per

capita income; third-highest in houses without radios (96.3%) and in nonvoters in the last national election (92% in 1963); fourth-highest in the proportion of the labor force engaged in agriculture (77%); and sixth-highest (89%) in people living outside towns of at least 2,500 population. Arable land is so scarce that only 8 per cent of the farm families in the Department of Ayacucho are scheduled to benefit from the sweeping land reform being carried out by the present military government. "Conflict levels in Ayacucho are very high, as land lawsuit(s) and peasant community boundary dispute(s)... suggest," David Scott Palmer found in a statistical comparison of land court cases throughout Peru.<sup>5</sup> "The presence of high levels of conflict within the peasant 'class' in Ayacucho suggests that sharp cleavages exist here, and that internal unity is consequently low." The average income of Huanta's 12,020 farmers has been estimated at \$65 per year.<sup>6</sup> According to Antonio Díaz Martínez, an Ayacucho agronomist who participated in the peasant uprisings of the 1960s:

Around Huanta and Luricocha, the peasant economy is based on a precarious subsistence agriculture, complemented by small income yielded by artisanship and migrations. Most peasants have one hectare of so-called irrigated land, but there is great insecurity because of the scarcity of water. In the dry months (May to September) each peasant's turn for irrigation comes every 45 or 60 days... Many of these peasants are migrants who travel to the jungle of the Apurimac River (Acón and Choimacota) for six months each year cultivating small plots of land as squatters. There they plant one hectare of food staples (yuca, plantains, pituca, corn) and one hectare of commercial crops (coca, coffee, barbasco) that are sold on the highland *punas* or in the market at Huanta.<sup>7</sup>

The dry hills around Huanta have become almost legendary in Peruvian history as the scene of a series of Indian rebellions that have continued sporadically through the Republican period.<sup>8</sup> The Indians had supported the Spaniards in the Wars of Independence, and did not recognize the new republic until a separate treaty was signed with them in 1839, 15 years after the army of the Venezuelan General José Antonio de Sucre defeated the Spaniards in the decisive Battle of Ayacucho on the nearby Plain of Quinua. However, in 1857 the

people of Huanta joined in a major insurrection against the central government, and in 1882 the Bishop of Ayacucho was shot to death while crossing the Plaza de Armas to mediate between a furious mob and the army detachment in the town.<sup>9</sup> In 1887 and 1892 Huanta rebelled against a new head tax decreed by the central government,<sup>10</sup> while in 1896-97 the cause for revolt was a new salt tax levied by Lima in a desperate effort to find funds for a bankrupt treasury in an economy left in shambles by Peru's disastrous loss to Chile in the War of the Pacific. According to the historian Jorge Basadre: "When the salt tax edict was published in September 1896, the guerrilla commanders went to the subprefect's office to say that they would not pay taxes on such a basic food staple. They also asked for circulation of Bolivian money in the region. The Indians rebelled on September 27 with 2,000 men against 25 and killed the subprefect." When an expeditionary force of 800 men came from Lima to put down the rebellion, "the province of Huanta was devastated." The head of the expeditionary force wrote later: "These are very valiant people who fought from hilltop to hilltop without surrendering. I say frankly that without our modern rifles they would have given us a very bitter experience.... The women are as ferocious as their husbands and cheer them on with shouts and applause."<sup>11</sup> Writing a few years later, Manuel Gonzalez Prada, a leader of the *indigenista* movement of Peruvian intellectuals who were among the principal ideologues of social reform in the twentieth century, asked: "Does the Indian suffer less under the Republic than under Spanish domination? If neither *corregimientos* nor *encomiendas* no longer exist, forced labor and recruitment remain.... We maintain him in ignorance and servitude; we vilify him in army barracks; we stupify him with alcohol; we launch him into disastrous civil wars and, from time to time, we destroy him in manhunts and slaughters like Amantani, Ilave and Huanta."<sup>12</sup>

It was in the dry dust of this backwardness and poverty that the explosive growth in public education has taken place in recent years. According to the 1940 census, only about 16 per cent of the school-age population of the Department of Ayacucho had ever been in a classroom, compared with 31 per cent of all Peruvians in the 6-14 age group. The proportion of those 15 years and older who had ever been to school (14.2%) was only about one-third of the national rate (43%). Since 1940 primary enrollments in the Department of

Ayacucho have tripled while they have multiplied fivefold throughout Peru. However, despite this overall lag, the most spectacular increases of the 1958-1968 decade took place precisely within these forgotten provinces of the sierra, reaching their climax in the 1961-1966 period when the number of primary pupils in the Department of Ayacucho grew at an average annual rate of 13.6 per cent, compared with 5.3 per cent for Peru as a whole.<sup>13</sup>

The social and political impact of this growth is most easily seen in the city of Ayacucho, which has grown from a sleepy and isolated departmental capital (population 16,642 in 1940 and 24,836 in 1961) into one of the leading educational centers in the Andes. Ayacucho's sudden growth in the 1960s is due almost entirely to the infusion of people and government funds into the new educational institutions that have proliferated over the past decade. The National University of Huamanga, reopened in 1959 after being closed for more than 70 years, mushroomed in size from 551 students in 1963 to nearly 4,000 in 1973, while a private Catholic university opened in 1968 had attracted 1,230 by 1973. Only two Colegios Nacionales (public secondary schools) functioned in the city in 1940; there were 13 of them and five other post-primary educational institutions by the time of the uprisings and riots against Decree 006 in 1969. As a result of this sudden educational expansion, secondary and university students were estimated to represent more than one-fourth of Ayacucho's population (43,304) in 1972. Many of them came to the city from remote villages and Indian communities; they moved into hillside shack settlements such as San Juan Bautista and Carmen Alto, which increased in population by 250 per cent between 1961 and 1972. A 1970 census of the Pueblos Jóvenes<sup>14</sup> of Peru's principal cities showed that 38 per cent of Ayacucho's population lived in these marginal squatter settlements, with a significantly higher concentration of inhabitants under age 25 than the rest of Peru, and with as high a proportion of Spanish-speakers (86%) and persons 15 years or older with some secondary education (30%).<sup>15</sup> According to one of the leaders of the 1969 student uprising, "many of the students from the countryside bring their own food, mainly potatoes and corn, from their homes. They live together in small rooms that rent for S/50-100 (\$1.25 to \$2.50) per month, cooking for themselves, studying by candle or kerosene lamps and sleeping on sheepskins spread over the floor. They study more and get

better grades than the boys from town because they don't have money for the movies and the poolroom."

In Huanta Province the number of primary pupils nearly doubled between 1956 and 1970, while in Peru as a whole they have tripled. However, the most dramatic development of this period has been the quadrupling of the number of secondary students and their concentration in the town of Huanta itself, accounting for half the town's population growth between the censuses of 1961 and 1972. While in 1956 there were only 317 secondary students in town attending the Gran Unidad Escolar (GUE) Gonzales Vigil for boys and a nuns' school for girls, there were 1,358 by 1970, along with four new post-primary institutions: a night secondary school, an industrial school each for boys and girls and the normal school founded in 1963.

The stakes for these young people in secondary education were enormous as, in the words of ECLA, "the primary school does not guarantee, or is increasingly less able to guarantee, an escape from manual labor. Only a very few people have access to the university and in any event they must first pass through secondary school. Hence, secondary education is the keystone of the whole situation. It is the secondary school that provides the necessary passport to employment in the tertiary sector. It is not surprising, therefore, that whereas people everywhere have been forced to recognize the need to make primary education universal—although this is a long way from being achieved—many social groups seek to maintain secondary education as their own preserve."<sup>16</sup>

During the late 1960s the convergence of scores of leftist university professors and thousands of impoverished students on Ayacucho coalesced into a kind of "counter-establishment"<sup>17</sup> dominated by the Maoists who controlled the university administrative machinery and student federation. In the course of popular mobilization against university budget cuts, the land taxes that the Belaunde government tried unsuccessfully to impose in 1967, and against the military regime's Decree 006 in 1969, a broadly based Frente de Defensa del Pueblo (FDP) was formed from a wide range of groups: secondary and university students, school-teachers, *barriada* dwellers, market women, hospital employees, construction workers, truck and

taxi drivers, butchers, bakers, barbers, and the departmental peasant federation. All of these groups were vitally interested in the gratuity of public education, enabling the FDP to stage a five-hour mass meeting of 10,000 persons in the Plaza de Armas of Ayacucho on Tuesday, June 17, 1969 to protest against Decree 006, attended by "students, workers, teachers, and fraternal delegations from the provinces of Huanta, La Mar and Cangallo" under the noses of "tripod machine guns and police reinforcements posted on the towers of the colonial churches of San Francisco, Santo Domingo, and the Cathedral."<sup>18</sup> For the rest of that week sporadic skirmishes continued between students and police, as the sub-director of the Third Educational Region in Huancayo arrived to warn the students that he would close the Ayacucho schools for the year if they refused to end the strike that began the previous Friday. Throughout the Department of Ayacucho student demonstrations were staged in towns and villages like Cangallo, Vilcashuamán, Tambo, Huancapí, Huancasancos and Chincheros. On Friday, June 20, students and police clashed on a bridge in the outlying settlement of Capillapata and just outside the city's central marketplace. The students then took refuge inside the market, and the police sealed off the entrances and threw tear gas bombs inside, causing panic among shoppers and market women and giving rise to another round of skirmishing throughout the city that continued far into the night. These incidents were prelude to the bloody events of the next two days.

## II

Subprefect Cabrera told me later that the card game with the dentist and the Italian broke up at 5 A.M. on the morning of June 21, 1969. "I went to drink coffee on the plaza," he said. "About an hour later a truck driver informed me that the lawyer Cavalcante had been arrested in his house. It was not until 7:30 that I tried to phone Ayacucho from the post office. I learned that some 35 extremists had been arrested in Ayacucho and there was fighting in the streets. At 8:30 A.M. I was still talking on the phone to Ayacucho when a large mob of peasants surrounded the post office. At 9 they took me hostage and shoved me into the street. After a while they took me to Calvario, one of the hills overlooking the town, from which we all watched the fighting in the streets on Sunday morning. 'Go to town and find out what has

happened,' I told the Indians. 'Nothing would have happened here if you hadn't taken me hostage to exchange for Cavalcante. The police are coming to find me whole or in pieces. Then you will pay for this. The Civil Guard will visit each of you, house by house. Not only you will pay, but also your wives and children and sheep and chickens.' The Indians talked among themselves for awhile and finally said they would let me go. I went down to the side of the road and was picked up by a public works truck carrying four armed policemen."

Aurora Alvarado de Avila is a small woman with narrow eyes and a high-pitched voice who, as a market vendor, had extensive dealings with the peasants of the surrounding countryside and with the other market women who played a key role in the protests against Decree 006. A veteran of some of the peasant rebellions of the 1960s and an orator at the mass meetings in Huanta and Ayacucho during the week before the uprising, Sra. Avila explained later that the lawyer Cavalcante, the Lima-educated son of a local farmer, had become an important man to the peasants for his help in legal matters ever since he returned to Huanta to lead the fight against the 1967 municipal land tax (*predios rústicos*) decreed by the Belaunde regime. The military regime accused him of helping to organize the protests against Decree 006. However, Sra. Avila said, in a series of taped interviews, that "the only thing Mario Cavalcante did was to provide some legal writs requested by the peasants. He had been doing this ever since 1967, when a commission of our peasants had gone to Lima to protest the *predios rústicos* tax to President Belaunde, and Cavalcante returned to Huanta and spoke at a big rally, when the peasants named him legal advisor to the antitax committees. Not only did he provide legal services free of charge, but he also advised them on strategy because their leaders were in jail and they had nowhere to turn. On June 13 the market women called a 48-hour strike, and the people from the valley refused to bring tomatoes, greens, milk, firewood and other things to town, but the people from the highland *puna* brought meat, potatoes and *chuño* (dehydrated potatoes) to the market under police protection. There was no violence until Cavalcante's arrest, although the police went into the rural areas to try to force peasants to bring their products to market. When they heard of Cavalcante's arrest, the peasants went to the Civil Guard post and to the PIP (Policia de Investigaciones del Perú), but

nobody would tell them where the lawyer had been taken. It so happened that the *pagos* (rural settlements) of Caballococha, Alameda, Chancaray, Palomayo, Pucarajay and San Miguel had sent representatives to town that Saturday to press a claim in a dispute over irrigation waters. They urged the subprefect to send a telegram to inquire about Cavalcante. They didn't know the lawyer had already been flown to Lima at dawn with the other prisoners. The subprefect said he would try to talk with Cavalcante by telephone, and the peasants insisted on hearing his voice over the phone. After waiting without getting an answer, a group of women took the subprefect hostage and brought him to Calvario, just to find out more about Cavalcante. A Civil Guard sergeant named Espinosa sent an urgent telegram to Ayacucho, warning that if the Civil Guard in Huanta were not reinforced the whole town would disappear because the Indians had taken over the place. After the Civil Guard post already had been reinforced, the peasants cut the telegraph wires and the bridge leading to the town and went back to their homes for the night."

Early the next morning crowds of peasants began to gather at the outskirts of town. By 10 A.M. about 10,000 of them had congregated in the park beside the hospital and began to march with sticks, stones, and slingshots along the Girón Santillana toward the center of town. They held a small rally in the Alameda Park and continued on toward the Plaza de Armas to hold a larger mass meeting, but a cordon of Civil Guards, with other policemen and PIP detectives posted on the rooftops, blocked their way with machine guns. In the forefront of the peasants marched the "*chutos*," from the highland *punas*, carrying banners. Then came the women and students and after them the men. "As we approached the post office we women and students gradually overtook the *chutos* because those butchers would knock over those poor wretches at once but would think twice before shooting women," one of the market vendors said. "We locked together, arm-in-arm, those wearing town dresses and those with *polleras* (peasant skirts). The students advanced from behind and warned us against causing any disorders. My three sons were behaving like men. Suddenly the police launched teargas bombs and we were frightened. Amid the smoke we began to cough and our eyes burned terribly. Then the men began to curse and got ready to fight, but we women stopped them. 'Wait,' we said.

"The police think we're going to attack them. We women will go to them to make clear we only want to hold a meeting.'" It is hard to tell how the real fighting started, whether from the stones launched from the peasants' slingshots or from the police *balines* (rubber bullets meant only to graze the skin). "The mob started shouting at the police, but the students urged the people to take another street toward the plaza," one student told me later. "After the *balines* and the stones started flying, the police started firing their machine guns to kill. The students then threw molotov cocktails and dynamited the police station. The police retreated to the Plaza de Armas across the rooftops and through the streets and started to fire wildly at the crowd. The police were very frightened; they were greatly outnumbered and were short of teargas masks and had no cars."

By 11 A.M. there were scores of casualties. The 44-bed municipal hospital had no operating room, x-ray equipment, or blood bank. When the shooting began, mattresses were spread out along the corridors to accommodate the wounded. An American Baptist missionary used his short-wave radio to call Lima and Ayacucho for first-aid help, and a helicopter arrived later in the day with doctors and nurses and some medicines. Meanwhile, the crowd turned on the PIP headquarters. According to Juan Saavedra López, a local storekeeper, "the peasants went looking for the head of the PIP in Huanta, a man named Uribe, whom they saw kill two students. The PIP detectives climbed on the roofs, threw teargas and fired their machine guns from the middle of the street. My 22-year-old daughter Irene, who was studying her fifth year of night secondary school, was shot in the head and died instantly. She left two children, fathered by a guitarist who never married her because of my stubbornness. The boy next to her was shot in the portal of the plaza when he shouted at Uribe: 'This is how they massacre helpless people.'"

Set afire by the students' molotov cocktails, the PIP headquarters began to burn rapidly and in the streets bonfires were lighted with police files and documents. A frightened merchant locked himself in his store and threw money into the street to pacify the peasants, who then broke down the door and sacked the premises. Meanwhile, the police barricaded themselves strategically around the plaza: in the church tower, in the city hall, in the upstairs rooms of the corner pharmacy, behind the

cement walls inside the plaza. People commented later that the mob kept on advancing as if it wanted to force the police to exhaust all their ammunition before the final assault. Around 4 P.M. word began to spread that about 200 shock troops, known as *sinchis*, were entering the town on foot. They had been flown to Ayacucho from Lima on the same plane that carried the 38 arrested "extremists" to Lima the morning before. Their entry into the town had been delayed by the destruction of the bridge the night before, but their belated arrival was with guns blazing and they completely dominated the situation by nightfall. The *sinchis* declared a state of siege in Huanta, forbidding all pedestrian and vehicular traffic on the streets, while the government in Lima announced a death toll of 14 persons. As is usual after such uprisings, local sources claimed that the number of dead was much higher. According to an account published two years later, "at 7 P.M. on Sunday night, the police collected the dead and wounded in the dark, using ponchos and improvised stretchers. On one corner, a garbage truck picked up the dead."<sup>19</sup>

### III

Two days after the uprising in Huanta, on June 24, 1969, known as the Day of the Indian, the "Revolutionary Government" repealed Decree 006 and proclaimed the most sweeping land reform program of the past decade in Latin America. A month later, in his first annual message to the Peruvian people, the new military President, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, announced that "the Ministry of Education is laying the groundwork for a complete restructuring of the educational system. An overall and realistic approach to the problem of illiteracy deserves special attention through the development of an authentic rural school intimately linked to the actions of the agrarian reform."<sup>20</sup> An Education Reform Commission was formally appointed in November 1969 and produced a widely discussed General Report ten months later and a draft law in March 1971. After intense internal and public debate a revised draft law was finally published in December 1971 and the new General Education Law formally decreed on March 21, 1972.

The design of the new education reform has met with a generally favorable response. A World Bank staff report, which prepared the way for a \$40 million loan to finance construction and equipment


of 49 new secondary schools, called it "comprehensive and innovative. It covers all levels and programs of education and provides a framework for a reformed education system which will go far in meeting the needs of the country's socioeconomic structure over the next two decades or so."<sup>21</sup> While the new law proclaims the intention of bringing children under five years old into the school system and of providing different forms of "non-school education" (*educación no escolarizada*) such as literacy, televised courses and job-training for adults, the basic thrust of the reform is to reduce drastically the enormous wastage of the rapidly expanding apparatus of formal schooling by cutting down the dropout rate and making education more relevant to economic productivity and the need to earn a living. The 1970 report of the Education Reform Commission attacked "the absence of significant content at all branches and levels of education and the excessive memorization in teaching methods.... Students do not acquire basic skills, such as intelligent reading and reflective thought, nor are they trained for any useful and productive activity."<sup>22</sup> To reduce the dropout rate in primary schools, the reform is attempting to end frustration and humiliation inside the classroom by endorsing instruction in vernacular languages in Indian areas and by allowing virtually all pupils to be promoted from grade to grade, whatever their performance.<sup>23</sup> While Peruvian students until now have been attending six years of primary school and five years of secondary, the educational sequence will be gradually restructured over the next two decades to embrace nine years of "general basic education" followed by three years of professionally oriented secondary education in a new type of school called ESEP (Escuela Superior de Educación Profesional). At all levels the curriculum, texts and teaching methods are to be gradually but drastically revised to make them more relevant to the student's life, environment and his future vocational needs. As of the 1974 school year, the new curriculum and texts have been introduced in the first three primary grades, and the reform is scheduled to reach one new grade each year.

While in Latin America the rural school has traditionally been "an exotic and sickly import from the cities,"<sup>24</sup> Peru's Education Reform has adopted as its basic unit of school administration the *nucleo escolar* (Nucleo Escolar Campesino) that has been operating in flawed and limited fashion for the past three decades in many rural areas.

Financed with United States aid in the 1940s and 1950s, these were described by the Reform Commission as a "valuable organizational creation" representing the "most successful, most extensive and oldest" educational experiment in the country that would replace "the present obsolete, onerous and inefficient school organization."<sup>25</sup> In recent decades the *nucleos* have operated in the form of a central schoolhouse offering all five years of primary education and several satellite schools in the surrounding countryside that provide instruction through the second or third grade. Under the new Education Reform, the concept of the *nucleo* has been greatly enlarged (Nucleo Escolar Comunal) to embrace a school district governed by a director chosen by the Ministry from a list of three candidates presented by a Community Education Council, and composed of elected representatives of teachers and parents as well as of local public officials. In the words of a key member of the Reform Commission:

In the context of the Peruvian Revolution many things are changing. Even the instruments of formulation of educational policy have been adjusted to correspond with the other structural reforms, with the transfer of power from the oligarchy to the people. The institutionalization of participation in the educational field is shown in one of the most original and daring concepts of the educational reform: nuclearization. Nuclearization of the educational community mobilizes the participation of the citizens of the district in the dual process of criticism and creation which will permit the definition of authentic educational models, rooted in the culture and needs of an organized community.<sup>26</sup>

"Participation" has become the most widely used catchword in the official propaganda and the most deeply ambivalent political strategy of Peru's military regime. This ambivalence has charmed political scientists throughout the world into a lusty scholastic debate over the "corporatist" (i.e., not quite fascist) nature of the new political system. The reformed educational system has been designed as a key element of the new political morphology in which, theoretically, the central government would assume the role of a guide and guardian of national security and public order while much of the country's social and economic life would be in the hands of "local participation



Top: the *nucleo escolar* of Zurita, Cuzco (1974). Bottom: the morning formation, near Huarcocondo, Cuzco (1974) (*Nucleo escolar*).

units" of various types, including the *nucleos escolares*. According to Palmer's analysis of this new morphology: "These local participation units are organized by functional sector: agricultural cooperatives and peasant communities; manufacturing communities and neighborhood associations. They are created at the initiative of the central government, and the members are organized and provided with orientation by cadres of government 'contact points' representing the bureaucracies at the local level. The central government has created, in addition, a national organization [SINAMOS]<sup>27</sup> with offices at the department and province levels with the explicit function of stimulating and channeling citizen participation into these local units. These units are, in turn, directed toward the output structures [line agencies] of government."<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, he adds: "The rhetoric of revolution of this government, with its emphasis on the transferral of effective power to the people, is...combined with the practice of strong central control. Virtually every initiative of the government to date regarding participation has been tempered by a number of direct or indirect controls. Opportunities to participate in the workplace and residence are being created, indeed, but within very carefully circumscribed limits which almost invariably insure retention of control over the important questions by either the government bureaucracy or the present owners of the means of production. This is to insure that development goals are not disrupted, that citizens learn to participate in the larger questions by participating in the smaller ones, and that military concerns with internal security are not compromised. The potential for participation as expressed in the ideology is very great; the practice, so far, is quite limited."<sup>29</sup>

#### IV

The character of Peru's education reform cannot be understood without a careful reading both of these official designs and of the evolving ideology and mystique of the school in Latin America in the twentieth century. According to ECLA, "every revolutionary regime, without neglecting other socializing agencies, tends to attach tremendous importance to the schools as a means of transmitting the new value system it is trying to impose. From this standpoint, there is no difference between the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Cuban Revolution of 1959."<sup>30</sup>

In the Mexican Revolution, which provided the cultural model for the expansion of schooling in Latin America, the spread of education to the peasant population became a quasi-religious movement in which the school was seen as an ecumenical and revolutionary instrument of social redemption. "*Educar es redimir*" became the slogan. José Vasconcelos, Mexico's first Secretary of Education in 1921, was "strongly influenced by Tolstoy... a pacifist and equalitarian."<sup>31</sup> Writing in the early 1930s, Frank Tannenbaum observed: "No outcome of the Mexican Revolution is more significant than the educational movement that has grown from it. The educational undertaking is... broader in scope and more deeply touched with a sense of emergence of a new spirit than either the agrarian or labor movements.... Education in Mexico tends to become education for the community rather than for the individual."<sup>32</sup> In 1923 Vasconcelos sent the first "Cultural Mission" into the countryside for the evangelical work of training rural teachers and community development; the staff of these missions as they multiplied and spread throughout Mexico in the 1920s and 1930s usually included a "rural organizer" trained in agricultural extension, a social worker, a nurse-midwife, a music teacher, a plastic arts teacher and a mechanic who ran the motion-picture machine and taught and performed other mechanical operations.<sup>33</sup> Tannenbaum saw that "the community must build the school building; it must provide the basic essentials (the furniture and equipment of the school), insofar as they are provided at all, by making them; it must furnish a piece of land for the school, from the resources of which the basic school needs can be slowly satisfied; it must provide keep and maintenance for the teacher through the tilling of the plot set aside for the teacher's income. *The rural community must support the school in the future the way it supported the Church in the past.*"<sup>34</sup> The manifold functions assumed by the school in this mystique is described in an inspector's report at the time from a village in Oaxaca:

The school building has been whitewashed, a donation of five hectares of land for the agriculture of the school has been secured, we have secured school furniture, the house for the teacher has been constructed, we succeeded in getting the community to purchase a gasoline lamp for the night school, a school seal was purchased, a chicken coop, a dove house, an athletic field and a garden



have been constructed, a flag has been secured for the school. We are asking from the National Telegraph the installation of the telegraph-telephone apparatus, we secured through the cooperation of the community the fixing of the road, a new educational committee has been named, the open-air theater is under construction, a committee on health has been installed, all of the children and most of the adults have been vaccinated, an anti-alcoholic committee has been named....The school has 10 hectares in coffee and three in coconuts.<sup>35</sup>

The Mexican Revolution tried "to create a system of values which incorporated the Indian not only as a useful member of the nation, but as part of the definition of national excellence."<sup>36</sup> This greatly strengthened Peru's *indigenista* movement in the 1920s and 1930s, which itself was the product of a long and rich intellectual genealogy.<sup>37</sup> It was in Mexico that APRA, Peru's most important political party for the next half-century, was founded by Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre in 1924, the same year that Hildebrando Castro Pozo published his influential *Nuestra Comunidad Indígena* after serving briefly as Director of Indian Affairs under President Augusto Leguía (1919-1930). (After his break with Leguía's civilian dictatorship, Castro Pozo taught sociology at the Colegio San Miguel in the northern coastal city of Piura, where one of his students was the future President Velasco Alvarado.)<sup>38</sup> The French historian François Chevalier stresses the influence of Gorki and the Russian agrarianist writers on the Peruvian *indigenistas*, as well as the provisions of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, based on Emiliano Zapata's 1911 *Plan de Ayala*, which had recognized the rights of Indian communities to hold property and to re-establish the lost *ejidos*.<sup>39</sup> As in other revolutionary movements of the time, questions of education were discussed by Peru's *indigenistas* almost as much as questions of land. In his classic *Seven Essays on Peruvian Reality* (1928) José Carlos Mariátegui, who wrote profusely on educational matters and who later became the household idol of Peruvian Marxism, offered a widely held view of the role of the school in Peruvian society:

The first century of republican life closes with an enormous deficit in public education. The problem of illiteracy is almost intact. The State so far has been unable to

establish schools throughout the national territory. The difference between the size of the job and the resources at hand is enormous. Teachers are lacking for the modest program of popular education authorized by the budget. Less than 20 per cent of all teachers are normal school graduates.... The career of primary school teacher, still subject to the taunting and contamination of landlords and local political chiefs, is one of misery, without any stability. The complaint of any Congressman, used to finding the teachers of his district in his submissive train of courtiers, weighs more in official thinking than the service record of any conscientious teacher. The problem of illiteracy of Indians goes beyond any pedagogical plan. Each day proves that literacy is not education. The elementary school does not redeem the Indian socially and morally. The first real step toward his redemption must be the abolition of his servitude.<sup>40</sup>

Leguía's autocratic methods soon led to a break with the *indigenistas*, and the departure of many of them into exile, after they opposed his re-election in 1923. However, *indigenismo* remained official doctrine, though weakly implemented,<sup>41</sup> and primary school enrollments doubled during the 1919-1930 *oncenio* in one of the strongest surges of growth in this century, generated by a major economic expansion. Indian normal schools were founded in three regions of the sierra in 1930 and Indian Education Commissions were formed in Ayacucho, Huanta, Huancavelica, Huancayo, Jauja, and Tarma.<sup>42</sup>

After the Depression truncated this expansion and precipitated Leguía's overthrow, a new fusion of the educational ideals of the Mexican Revolution and Andean *indigenismo* occurred in the Bolivian village of Warisata, across Lake Titicaca from Puno, where the first *nucleo escolar campesino* was founded in 1931. Initiated as an effort to train rural teachers in a rural setting, Warisata became by the mid-1930s a network of 33 village schools spread over a radius of 60 miles on the Bolivian *altiplano*, all controlled from the central school of Warisata near the lakeside town of Achacachi each with its own land and workshops, and governed by *Amautas*, or wise men. According to Elizardo Pérez, the founder of Warisata,

...[this system] would integrate a nucleus of vital activities, in agriculture and other work, in constant relation to the central school. The satellite elementary schools provided the central school with products of the different regions and received in exchange the products of the central school's artisan workshops, especially construction materials such as tiles for roofing.... Among the teachers were many who responded with great human quality, as well as others who failed and more than one who was expelled by the Indians themselves for incompetence. Not just everyone could do this job, which required maximum honesty and permanent effort. We could not allow repetition of the case of the rural teacher eager to live at the Indian's expense with nobody to control his cheating. Now the eyes of the community and the Parliament of *Amautas* watched over him, and above them was the severe control exercised from the central school.<sup>43</sup>


Warisata became such a model in the field of Indian education that, in 1944 and 1945, representatives of the Education Ministries of Peru and Bolivia met in Arequipa and then in Warisata itself with United States educational advisers to lay the groundwork for the creation of the first *nucleos escolares campesinos* in Peru, and for others in Bolivia, under these general principles:<sup>44</sup>

+The Indian problem is a problem of the State, embracing socioeconomic, health, communications, educational, agrarian, and juridical aspects....

+Education provided by rural schools should be basically agricultural, without obstructing the more gifted pupils from going on to higher studies.

+The influence of the rural school should reach into the peasant home to improve all aspects of life.

The establishment of the first 16 *nucleos escolares campesinos* in southern Peru in 1947, around Lake Titicaca and in the Vilcanota-Urubamba Valley of Cuzco Department, institutionalized the convergence of *indigenismo* with the separate but related phenomenon of United States



Indian schoolboy in a Cuzco *nucleo escolar* (1974).

influence on Peruvian education in this century. The story of this influence is a wedding of the noble and the ludicrous. Under the first administration of President Leguía (1908-1912), the European (mainly French) educational models and advisers of the nineteenth century were brusquely replaced by a troop of Americans in key positions: adviser to the Minister of Education; director of the Normal School in Lima; inspector of schools in the Departments of Lima and Puno; rector of the University of Cuzco; supervisor of commercial education and secretary to an educational reform commission.<sup>45</sup> When Leguía returned to power in 1919 the scope of the United States mission was expanded to where one of its members could boast in print that Peru had become the first Latin American nation to "take the radical step of turning over its entire system of public education to an American mission on the ground."<sup>46</sup> According to Paulston, who belonged to a later United States mission, efforts were made "to recruit American teachers and administrators who had worked under

the United States colonial governments in the Philippines or in Puerto Rico. Evidence seems to indicate that the 24 advisers hired by 1921 were in general mediocre and unsuited for service in Peru. Only a few could speak Spanish...."<sup>47</sup> Manuel Vicente Villarán, Leguía's first Minister of Education and architect of the reforms of 1913 and 1920, advocated the switch from the French to the U.S. system because, "with all its admirable intellectuality, [France] still has not been able to modernize, democratize and unify sufficiently her educational system and methods." On the other hand, "the great European peoples today reform their plans of instruction to follow the Yankee model, because they understand that the needs of the time demand men of enterprise and not literary nor erudite types."<sup>48</sup>

The most fruitful cross-fertilization of American and *indigenista* influences came not in government offices but in the distant *altiplano* Department of Puno in the early decades of the century. These were the years of maximum expansion of the hacienda system in Peru, of vast enclosure movements under various legal ruses and pretexts that wrested ancestral lands from the Indian communities, and of several Indian rebellions in response to these pressures. In 1911 the "First Regional Congress of Normal School Graduates" was held in Arequipa to discuss two related problems, Indian education and the usurpation of Indian lands under the economic incentive of rising world prices for sheep and alpaca wool, leading to peasant uprisings throughout the *altiplano*.<sup>49</sup> One of those normal school graduates was Jose Antonio Encinas, who with the collaboration of the American school inspector, Joseph A. MacKnight, conducted educational experiments in Puno that led to charges by a local Congressman of "teaching doctrines contrary to the Constitution of the State." These experiments and rebellions coincided with an evangelizing campaign of the Seventh Day Adventists in the provinces bordering Lake Titicaca. In the Province of Chucuito, where major Indian uprisings occurred in 1903, 1905, and 1912, the Adventist missionary Ferdinand Stahl went from hut to hut "carrying a bit of relief for the ailments of typhoid, typhus, and smallpox that decimated the aboriginal population." Visiting the Adventist center of La Plateria two decades later as a Congressman, Encinas observed that they "possessed primary schools, normal schools, and hospitals and had reached about 5,000 converts....The basic

thing is that they are transforming the spirit of the Indian, bring him into civic life, making him aware of his rights and obligations, separating him from the vices of coca and alcohol, removing superstition, curing illnesses, showing the best way toward human dignity."<sup>50</sup>


While the Bolivian *nucleo escolar campesino* of Warisata may have served as the official model for the establishment of the first *nucleos* in Peru in the 1940s, the Adventist schools in the Puno region may have been even more influential in making possible this new departure in rural education.<sup>51</sup> Writing in the 1960s, the Peruvian anthropologist Gabriel Escobar provided this description of the Adventist schools:

The Adventists began their work in 1906... and by 1940 claimed some 20,000 faithful, which today might more accurately be 10,000. The Adventists are in almost all rural districts, grouped around their own primary schools that also serve as places of worship. The school director is also a missionary who alternates between teaching children, preaching and reading from the Bible. It is interesting to note that the Adventist orientation is toward greater social mobility [of the Indian] toward becoming a *cholo* or mestizo, and toward urban life with a strongly nationalist tendency....The teachers are almost always rural Indian converts to Adventism who work with religious zeal and who are paid just enough to live on by the community. The school buildings are constructed by the faithful themselves or with their monetary contributions. The school calendar is different from that of public schools, absorbing less time and better adjusted to the annual cycle of the community's economic activity; it begins just after the harvest in March or April and ends just before planting time. During vacations, the teachers attend training courses in Puno or Juliaca and devote themselves to missionary work. Apparently, without being able to confirm this, under this system these schools have a higher regular attendance than public schools and more of their pupils finish their primary education, going on to Chullunquiani, the secondary school of the Adventists in Juliaca.<sup>52</sup>

At its apogee the U.S. advisory mission, SECPANE (Servicio Cooperativo Peruano-Norteamericano de Educación), occupied the entire tenth floor of the Education Ministry's skyscraper, which until recently was the tallest building in Lima. The Education Ministry was besieged every summer by swarms of teachers from the provinces who crowded the entrances and corridors in search of transfers, promotions, appointments, pensions, etc., while on the sidewalks outside swarms of *tinterillos* with portable typewriters and collapsible tables would fill out documents for them on special paper with official seals. Using the model of Warisata and the Adventist schools of Puno, SECPANE provided capital funds and supervision for what was, in effect, its own Indian school system that by 1960 embraced 73 *nucleos* throughout the sierra containing 2,416 central and satellite schools and an enrollment of 226,000 pupils. They were much more luxuriously furnished than the rest of Peru's rural schools; some combined "large classrooms, sanitary facilities, barber shops, pens for raising domestic animals, desks and furniture, living quarters for teachers, offices, shops, agricultural tools, electric generators, film projectors and with everything else that within natural limitations could be used to contribute to a good basic education for the child and the adult community."<sup>53</sup>

However, when SECPANE was eliminated on orders from Washington in 1962 and replaced by a more modest advisory mission from Columbia University Teachers College, this was "a near death-blow for the *nucleos*. The Cuzco warehouse, containing school equipment and supplies, was looted straightway. The ministry continued to pay supervisors' and teachers' salaries but little else.... Supervisors in literacy, agriculture, and health lacked transport and expenses and could no longer travel from the central *nucleo* to the isolated sectional schools."<sup>54</sup> The *nucleos* seemed to be dependent on the status symbols and economic incentives provided by United States aid. When, for example, SECPANE began withdrawing its financial aid to the Quiquijana *nucleo* near Cuzco in 1955 after its initial capital investment, a rapid turnover of supervisors and directors began to impede the functioning of the satellite schools, the farming cooperatives and adult education. Together with these problems, "the lack of efficient and stable administrative personnel, as well as supervisors and teachers who could teach in the workshop (full of equipment never used) made the Quiquijana *nucleo* appear to be at the edge of failure."<sup>55</sup> While roughly 27 per cent of Quiquijana's pupils failed the year's work between 1946 and 1961, a lower failure rate than in most rural schools, success in school has meant

Fiesta in Apurímac (1970).



"constant and recent migrations of the community's youth to larger cities as soon as they finish their primary schooling in the *nucleo*." another major problem, which has plagued the schools of the sierra throughout their expansion, is the use of Spanish rather than Quechua as the initial language of instruction:

The decision to teach in Spanish as the national language was taken by SECPANE before forming the Quiquijana *nucleo*. The problem was establishing a period of transition from Quechua to Spanish. The general opinion has been that, if the teacher forbids the pupils to speak Quechua, they would learn Spanish in from six months to a year, impelled by necessity. However, since the children speak Quechua anyway at play and in their houses, the problem turned out to be more serious and complex than it previously appeared to be. The language barrier was one of the most notorious im-

pediments to teaching in the Quiquijana *nucleo*, making necessary a review of the methods and materials used in teaching.<sup>56</sup>

In response to this need, the Education Reform Commission in 1970 urged the adoption of an official Quechua alphabet as a first step toward using Quechua and other Indian vernaculars of the sierra and jungle as languages of primary instruction in the public schools of these regions. Its report added that the practice of teaching in Spanish to children unable to understand the language was "greatly responsible for school dropouts, the psychic traumatization of monolingual children and their failure to learn reading and writing."<sup>57</sup> At the same time, the five departments of the southern sierra known as the *manchu indigena*<sup>58</sup>—Puno, Cuzco, Apurímac, Ayacucho, and Huancavelica—was declared a "priority zone" for the application of the Education Reform for reasons of social justice, "to support the agrarian reform within the scheme of ongoing structural changes."<sup>59</sup>

#### NOTES

1. From Pedro Cieza de León, *The Incas* (1553). Translated by Harriet de Onis. Edited with an introduction by Victor Wolfgang von Hagen, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959, p. 120.
2. For an account of the research of the Ayacucho Archeological-Botanical Project based on field work in 1969-70, see Richard S. MacNeish, "Early Man in the Andes," *Scientific American*, April 1971, p. 37.
3. CEPD (Centro de Estudios de Población y Desarrollo), *Informe Demografico del Perú: 1970*, Lima, 1972. p. 20. My 1972 data are taken from the provisional results of the 1972 census.
4. Compiled by David Scott Palmer in his "Revolution from Above": *Military Government and Popular Participation in Peru, 1968-72*, Cornell University Latin American Studies Program Dissertation Series, No. 47, January 1973, pp. 182-4.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 196-98.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-3.
7. Antonio Díaz Martínez, *Ayacucho: Hombre y Esperanza*, Ayacucho, 1969, p. 187.
8. The best available history of these rebellions is in Luis T. Cavero, *Monografía de la Provincia de Huanta*, 2 vols., Lima and Huancayo, 1953-57.
9. Jorge Basadre, *Historia de la República del Perú* (Sixth Edition), Lima: Editorial Universitaria, 1968. Vol. VIII, pp. 379-80.
10. *Ibid.*, IX, 155.
11. *Ibid.*, X, 182-3.
12. From Manuel Gonzalez Prada, *Horas de Lucha*, Lima: Ediciones Peisa, 1969, p. 228. The quotation is from the essay "Nuestros Indios" (1904).
13. See Martha Bargar and Peter Gardiner, *Population of Peru: Estimates and Projections 1962-2002*, Washington: U.S. Census Bureau Demographic Reports for Foreign Countries Series P-96 No. 4, 1971, p. 24.
14. Literally, "Young Towns," the official euphemism for *barriadas* or marginal squatter settlements. The census definition of *Pueblos Jóvenes* is "urban settlements originating through migrations and/or inorganic growth of the cities with populations of 10,000 or more, and are characterized by being located in or around government or private land and by lacking some or all of such basic services as water, sewerage, electricity, streets, sidewalks, market-places, schools, and public health stations." From National Office of Census and Statistics, *Censo de Pueblos Jóvenes 1970: Asistencia Escolar y Nivel de Educación*, Vol. II (1973), p. III.

15. In the Ayacucho squatter settlements 46.4% of the population was under 15 and 20.7% in the 15-24 age group, compared with 44.1% and 19.1%, respectively, for all Peru. See National Office of Census and Statistics, *Los Pueblos Jóvenes en el Perú*, Vol. I (1972), p. 81. For 1970 age structure estimates of general population, see Bargar and Gardner, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
16. ECLA (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America), *Education, Human Resources and Development in Latin America*, New York: United Nations, 1968, p. 86.
17. This is the phrase of Erik Cohen of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, in an unpublished analysis of the 1969 Ayacucho uprising, *Power Structure and Urban Riots: A Case Study and a General Framework for Analysis*. Cohen was a witness to the 1969 events. Published accounts include "Los Sucesos de Huanta y Ayacucho: Historia de una Lucha del Pueblo," in *Nueva Crónica y Buen Gobierno*, Supplement of the magazine *Narración Lima*, July 1971, and Aracelio Castillo Cruz, "El Movimiento Popular de Junio de 1969," in *Progreso*, No. 2. Huancayo: Universidad Nacional del Centro del Perú, September-October 1973. My reconstruction of these events is based on the above documents and my own interviews in Huanta and Ayacucho in March-April 1970.
18. "Los sucesos de Huanta y Ayacucho...", *op. cit.*
19. "Los sucesos de Huanta y Ayacucho...", *op. cit.*
20. From Juan Velasco Alvarado, *Velasco: La Voz de la Revolución*, Lima: SINAMOS, 1972. Vol. 1, p. 74.
21. World Bank, *Peru: Appraisal of a First Education Project* (mimeographed), November 1973, p. 7.
22. *Reforma de la Educación Peruana: Informe General*, Lima, 1970, p. 19. Henceforth referred to as *Informe*.
23. While students who fail theoretically are required to take make-up courses and examinations during the vacation period, in reality the organization of these courses have lagged so much that they generally are not available and students are promoted anyway.
24. ECLA, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
25. *Informe*, pp. 134-5.
26. From Leopoldo Chiappo, *Liberación de la Educación, Participación*, No. 2. Lima, February 1973, p. 33.
27. The acronym for *Sistema Nacional de Apoyo de la Movilización Social*, or National Support System for Social Mobilization.
28. Palmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12. This is the most coherent political study made to date of the theory and practice of Peru's military regime.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 161-62.
30. ECLA, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
31. Frank Tannenbaum, *Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread*, New York: Knopf, 1950, p. 155.
32. Frank Tannenbaum, *Peace by Revolution: An Interpretation of Mexico*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1933, pp. 263, 268.
33. A detailed discussion of the cultural missions is in George I. Sánchez, *Mexico: A Revolution by Education*, Foreword by Rafael Ramirez, New York: Viking, 1936, pp. 63-95.
34. Tannenbaum, (1933), p. 302.
35. Quoted in Tannenbaum, (1933), pp. 286-7.
36. ECLA, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
37. Basadre (XVI, 27-31) catalogues the intellectual currents shaping *indigenismo* as follows: "Before Independence: (a) The accounts of Garcilaso and de las Casas and their schools during the Conquest and colonial period that gave rise to the 'Black Legend' of Spanish destruction of Indian culture. (b) The 'Hispanic *indigenismo*' of priests, missionaries, linguists, etc., who sought out the Indian to 'redeem' him of idolatry and superstition, trying to understand him by studying his language and customs. (c) The European movement started by Montaigne that exalted the goodness of man in the state of nature and which... developed into the political ideas of Rousseau. (d) The European and American reaction against the thesis of De Pauw and others on the irremediable and degeneration of the inhabitants of the New World.
- "During the 19th and early 20th century: (e) The Liberal groups at the time of independence tried to justify the new regimes with Indian traditions. (f) The exponents of Romanticism in the early 19th century, as well as scientists such as the linguist Tschudi, conceived of the Indian and the Incas in a literary fashion. (g) The Protestant, especially Anglo-Saxon, authors who analyzed severely the influence of Spain in America and viewed the Indians sympathetically. (h) The Positivists who, at the end of the 19th century, dissected colonial institutions with a Liberal outlook and who, directly or indirectly, tended to vindicate the precolonial period. (i) The German Marxist sociologists, such as Cunow,... who showed strong interest in the collective economic organization of ancient Peru. (j) Natural science explorers, such as Reiss and Stübel who contributed to a greater knowledge of aboriginal civilization. (k) The moral or legal defenders of the Indian, symbolized in the mid-19th century by Juan Bustamante and the Sociedad Amiga de los Indios and, in the early 20th century, in the Asociación Pro-Indígena and other groups. (l) The Archaeologists who,

beginning with Max Uhle, discovered in the late 19th and early 20th centuries sensational finds that expanded in space and time the horizons of pre-Incaic culture and demonstrated the variety and importance of its artifacts; and the ethnologists, anthropologists, and sociologists, European and American, who studied scientifically the Incas and their predecessors. (m) On a literary and ideological plane, Manuel Gonzalez Prada's affirmation that the Indians are the real Peru, that 'our form of government is a great lie since a state in which two or three million people live without legal protection does not deserve to be called a democratic republic' and, finally, the Indian question being 'more economic and social than pedagogic' so that rebellion must be preached since 'all whites are, more or less, Pizarros, Vlaverdes or Areches.' (n) The Marxists, especially Communists, who many years later developed and systematized the thoughts of Gonzalez Prada, insisting that the base of social revolution must be agrarian and racial. (o) The regionalist artists and intellectuals, Andinists and serranists with hostility toward Lima, the coast and the whites and mestizos."

38. See Raúl Estuardo Cornejo, *Velasco, o el Proceso de una Revolución*, Lima: CEPEID, 1969, p. 88.

39. François Chevalier, "Official *Indigenismo* in Peru in 1920: Origins, Significance and Socioeconomic Scope," in Magnus Mörner, ed., *Race and Class in Latin America*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, p. 189. A translation and scholarly exegesis of the Plan de Ayala is published as Appendix B to John Womack, Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution*, New York: Knopf, 1969, pp. 393-404.

40. Mariátegui, *Siete Ensayos de Interpretación de la Realidad Peruana*, Havana: Casa de las Americas, 1963, p. 141. Also see Mariátegui, *Temas de Educación*, a collection of journalistic pieces published between 1923 and 1929, Lima: Biblioteca Amauta, 1970. Also Omar Zilbert Salas, "El Fenómeno Educativo en Lenin y Mariátegui," in *Lenin y Mariátegui*, Lima: Biblioteca Amauta, 1970.

41. According to Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 193, "the application of laws designed to protect the Indians were delayed. To the astute Leguía, these measures represented... a means... of placating and flattering a new sector of public opinion." However, Leguía bestowed legal recognition to relatively few Indian communities.

42. Basadre, XV, 96-7.

43. From Elizardo Pérez, *Warisata: La Escuela-Ayllu*, La Paz, 1962, pp. 188-9. Also see the interview with Pérez on his return to Bolivia after 20 years' absence, in *Presencia*, La Paz, January 26, 1974, p. 8.

44. From John Baum, *Los Nucleos Escolares Campesinos* (Second Edition), Mexico, 1967, p. 17.

45. James C. Carey, *Peru and the United States: 1900-1962*, South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964, p. 24.

46. William E. Dunn, "Peru's Progressive Educational Program," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, IV (1921), p. 511.

47. Paulston, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

48. Quoted in Mariátegui, *op. cit.*, pp. 97, 99.

49. For discussion of these uprisings, see Jean Piel, "A Propos d'un Soulèvement Rural Péruvien au Debut de Vingtieme Siecle: Tocroyoc (1921)," in *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, October-December 1967, pp. 375-405. For a statistical series on the fluctuations of the prices of wool and hides during this period, see Shane J. Hunt, *Price and Quantum Estimates of Peruvian Exports, 1830-1962*, Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School Research Program in Economic Development, January 1973. (mimeographed).

50. José Antonio Encinas, *Un Ensayo de la Escuela Nueva en el Perú* (1932), Second Edition. Lima, 1959, Vol. II, p. 10.

51. This is the view of Jorge Basadre, who was twice Minister of Education in the period when the *Nucleos Escolares Campesinos* were being designed and built in different parts of the sierra. (Personal communication).

52. From Gabriel Escobar M., *Organización Social y Cultural del Sur del Perú*, Mexico: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1967, pp. 66-80. For other accounts of social change in the Puno region, see Edward Dew, *Politics in the Altiplano: The Dynamics of Change in Rural Peru*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969; and François Bourricaud, *Changements a Puno: Etude de Sociologie Andine*, Paris: Institut des Hauts Etudes de l'Amérique Latine, 1962.

53. From a SECPANE report quoted in Paulston, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70.

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

55. Baum, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

57. *Informe*, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

58. Literally, Indian oilstain.

59. *Informe*, p. 168.








# Peru's Education Reform

## Part III: Dialogue of the Deaf

by Norman Gall



### PERU

Tension between teachers and the military government is just one of many obstacles facing the Education Reform. At least as serious is the continuing contradiction between the "Revolutionary Government's" libertarian rhetoric and its dictatorial methods and the Ministry of Education's mandarin bureaucracy.

[NG-5-74]

Fieldstaff Reports

American  
Universities  
Field Staff

*They [the elementary schools] are mainly in the hands of ignorant, unskilled teachers. The children are fed upon the mere husks of knowledge. They leave school for the broad theater of life without discipline; without mental power or moral stamina. . . . Poor schools and poor teachers are in a majority throughout the country. . . . Multitudes of the schools are so poor that it would be well for the country if they were closed. . . . They afford a sad spectacle of ignorance engaged in the stupendous fraud of self-perpetuation at the public expense.*

William Franklin Phelps, President of the  
National Education Association, 1870\*

Just as Peru's Education Reform was beginning to gain momentum, a series of strikes and uprisings in the cities of southern Peru in late 1973 established the national teachers' union, SUTEP (*Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores en la Educación del Perú*), as the main organized opposition to the five-year-old "Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces." The dismissal and arrest of SUTEP leaders in Puno and Arequipa triggered an escalating series of incidents that ended in an eight-day general strike in Arequipa, Peru's second-largest city. A supporting work stoppage by railroad and other transport workers paralyzed the movement of all goods, including critical supplies of food and fuel, from the coast to the inland towns and cities of the sierra. Then student uprisings throughout the region culminated in the burning down of the SINAMOS headquarters in a colonial palace in downtown Cuzco and the destruction of debt records of the agrarian reform. All this ended only after martial law was declared throughout the southern sierra and more than 100 SUTEP leaders were arrested in various parts of the country. But the strength of the teachers' movement had sufficiently stunned the government for President Juan Velasco Alvarado to warn in a press conference a few days later: "If they want war, they will have it. Here we stand: Either SUTEP will fall or the Revolution will fall."<sup>1</sup>

The teachers' movement had grown in strength and militancy after a 1971 national strike that failed when the pro-Moscow Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), which has become an avid supporter of the military regime, split from the movement and left seven strike leaders—including the Trotskyite peasant leader Hugo Blanco—to be deported by the government.<sup>2</sup> Afterward, the different teachers' guilds—primary, secondary, vocational, etc.—were united into a single national union, SUTEP, formed at a congress in Cuzco in June 1972 that was largely controlled by Maoist elements. During a visit to Puno a few months after the 1973 uprisings, a young

priest close to the movement explained to me that "the ambiguity of the teachers' movement allows different kinds of groups to participate. In the north of Peru many of the key positions in SUTEP are held by APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) leaders and in the south by Maoist groups such as Patria Roja and Bandera Roja and the Trotskyite Vanguardia Revolucionaria. Education is a political battlefield, and the education reform is used as a means of bringing awareness to the people. When four SUTEP leaders were arrested in Puno, taxi and truck drivers, secondary and university students, merchants and market women turned out in an attempt to win their freedom. SUTEP is forming political study groups and tries to show that the government suppresses the class struggle through the arrest of SUTEP leaders. The Moscow-oriented Communist leadership originally had condemned the strikes in southern Peru as part of a plot by "Yankee imperialism and the oligarchy" to "create artificial strikes impairing production and the national economy." Then the Secretary-General of the PCP-controlled Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP), Gustavo Espinoza, did a complete about-face when he saw the strength of the Arequipa movement after going there to talk the unions into going back to work. Apparently fearing the political consequences of being left on the sidelines of a protest movement having overwhelming popular support, Espinoza joined the strikers, declaring that "healthy, decent forces have been mobilized in the Arequipa events that have nothing to do with the imperialist and reactionary interests. Neither the bank employees nor the teachers nor the transport workers can be accused of being counterrevolutionary. . . ." <sup>3</sup>

Earlier this year I was able to smuggle a tape recorder into the Lurigancho Prison on the desert hills outside Lima to interview some of the Maoist SUTEP leaders arrested in late 1973. They were mostly young teachers in their late twenties and

\*Quoted in Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*. New York: Knopf, 1963, p. 303. This statement was made by Phelps at an NEA meeting before he was elected NEA president, when he was still head of a normal school in Winona, Minnesota.

early thirties who were products of the rapid expansion of teacher-training programs in Peruvian universities and normal schools in the 1960s. Their language reflected both the political radicalization of this period and the poor professional training received under the pressures of proliferating enrollments. Nevertheless, their role as leaders of the opposition to the military regime leads one to suspect that a new political generation is coming of age in Peru in some ways similar to the *mestizo* elements that emerged during APRA's revolutionary phase in the 1930s.<sup>4</sup>

## I

"The protest movement in Puno goes back some time," said Platón Palomino, a husky 29-year-old from Puno who was among the ten jailed school-teachers gathered around me in a corner of the prison yard at Lurigancho. "One of the most important events was the visit of President Velasco's wife to Puno on June 27, 1972. She had to be evacuated in an armored car during some tense moments in the midst of protests by students and workers for the freedom of certain jailed leaders. Officially, three people died in the melee that followed, but we know that others disappeared. The people who protested compared their own poverty with the great waste of money on the tour of the President's wife. Then, on October 25, 1973, four SUTEP leaders were arrested in Puno. On the following day the secondary students were mobilized for the first time in Puno's history to seek their teachers' freedom. The police attacked the secondary and university students, both male and female, in the streets and arrested people left and right. Then the students decided to stage sit-ins in all the school buildings. The police attacked them with rubber bullets (*balines*) and tossed teargas bombs into the schools and shut off the water and electricity. But the students stayed inside for 11 days, while the police arrested other leaders of the students and teachers.

"I am Provincial Secretary-General of Puno. One of the reasons they gave for our arrest is the discovery of arms and munitions in the Casa del Maestro in Puno. Until the night before the police raid on our headquarters I had seen neither arms nor explosives there. When the police entered the place to search on November 15 they entered with a truck. They blasted away the door of the Casa del Maestro. There were no arms nor munitions, just all our furniture destroyed. Someone wrote on a wall:

'People of Puno: This is the work of the Revolutionary Government. Enter and see.' For three hours the people went inside to see what the police had done until the police detachment returned and sealed the place off with armed guards. Two or three days later the newspapers of Lima published under big headlines the news that the police had found arms and explosives in the Casa del Maestro. This is why they say they are holding us as prisoners.'

In late 1974 President Velasco held a series of monthly meetings with SUTEP leaders aimed at reaching a *modus vivendi* between the teachers and the government. But these meetings were abruptly broken off when a group of Maoist SUTEP leaders began attacking those teachers' representatives who favored making a deal with Velasco that would bring major economic benefits to the profession. The leader of this Maoist faction was Arturo Sanchez Vicente, the 34-year-old Subsecretary-General of SUTEP, who was among the union officers whom I interviewed a few months before in the Lurigancho prison. He said at the time: "I personally consider the latest measures taken by the *Junta Militar* as reflecting its repressive, anti-popular and imperialist character, at the service of the industrial-financial bourgeoisie of the landlords [sic] that merely preserves the unjust social system in which we are living. I consider that the struggle today of the teachers and the entire Peruvian people is not merely economic, but fundamentally political. The repressive offensive of the *Junta Militar* will be met by a political counteroffensive of the people. We believe that the persecutions, the jailings, the beatings, the deportations, the murders, and the police terror sown in the midst of all popular organizations are political measures of the *Junta Militar* aimed at destroying these organizations. Speaking concretely, the teachers' problems include a pauper's salary of 4,000 soles (\$90); we are asking for a standard salary of S/10,200 per month that would rise automatically with the cost of living. The teachers' economic struggle is not selfish and isolated, but rather part of a general struggle of the people for increases in wages and salaries. The teachers are playing a vanguard role in the struggle for the people's liberation, the destruction of the unjust society in which we live, of this class society of exploiters and exploited, of oppressors and oppressed. We are moving toward destruction of bourgeois society. Our immediate economic struggle does not lie merely in salary claims, but also in obtaining official recognition [*personeria juridica*] for

SUTEP so the authorities will have to open their doors to us and deal with our claims. We are fighting for the right of all Peruvians to organize in unions of their choice. Here in jail we have consolidated our organization."

A university professor from Puno, also among the prisoners, said: "The first time I was arrested was during the student sit-ins in Puno, on November 6, when I was in jail for four days. I was a member of a committee trying to negotiate a solution to the problem of the jailed teachers and the student demonstrators, and was finally freed on November 10 under student and popular pressure. But I was arrested again a week later, on November 17, while riding in my car near the Plaza de Armas. They made me get out of my car and the beatings began almost as soon as I was brought to the police station. Just as I was entering some other prisoners were leaving, including the president of the Bar Association of Puno. Another professor and two university students had also been beaten and were being sent to Lima. My first beating was with fists and kicks. The second beating was with a leather club, after which they took all my belongings and left me in a cell. At midnight, they took me out for another beating. They handcuffed me behind my back and stuffed a towel in my mouth to keep me from shouting. Then began what may be called a systematic beating. The blows started at shoulder-level and gradually worked their way down to my abdomen, and then they worked me over in the same way down my back. They said they would beat me in such a way as to make me vomit blood. Then they told me they would beat me to death and throw me in Lake Titicaca. Back in my cell, I waited for another beating for two or three hours but they never returned. I was *incommunicado* for about 12 days. I couldn't speak with anyone. I was in a cell of about a cubic meter of space where the only thing that reached me was the food sent in by family after close scrutiny by the guards. After that the police interrogated me basically to find out where I got my money. They tried to prove that some international organization subsidized me. They found some border passes I had to cross over to the Bolivian side of the lake. Then they said I was in touch with some Bolivians to receive money. I told them these border passes were for a pilgrimage to Copacabana, a holy place on the Bolivian side of Lake Titicaca. The police were trying very hard to prove that some international political organization was involved in the Puno protest movement. From the police station in

Puno they took me to a detention pen in Lima called the Botao, and then here to the Lurigancho.

"The people of Puno responded in a very organized way to the call of SUTEP for support. There is an alliance of people's organizations called the *Frente 27 de Junio*, named in honor of the people's resistance at the time of the visit of President Velasco's wife. To this front belong different labor unions, people's organizations, and student associations that together called a general strike in support of the school buildings sit-ins that the secondary students had carried out in Puno. This general strike spread from the city of Puno to the entire department. The secondary students of the other provinces of the Department of Puno responded to SUTEP's call. In the first place, they were asking for their teachers' freedom, but at bottom they were protesting the wretched living conditions on this altiplano. They are supposed to have carried out an agrarian reform in Puno. Instead of having a debt to the landlord, as in the past, the peasants now have a debt to the state to pay for the same plot of land they've always lived on. The peasants have seen that the fundamental problem is the bureaucracy. Now it is the agricultural engineers, the managers of cooperatives, the foremen, who must be supported with high salaries. Nevertheless, the government propagandizes the agrarian reform throughout the region by showing that the lives of peasants on a few great expropriated haciendas really have improved somewhat. For example, if before the reform the peasant didn't have access to the owner's house, now the *campesinos* proudly say, 'Now I can go there when I want. Now it is mine.' But this doesn't solve the basic problem, the problem of the land. The government is trying to perpetrate a great deception. On one hand, their laws are very beautiful, but on the other hand they can dismiss and imprison teachers whenever they wish. The teacher lives close to the peasant under very hard conditions. And this is part of a long educational process."

## II

While Peru's Education Reform is still in its early stages, it is facing a number of major obstacles, of which the tensions between the teachers and the military government is merely one. Another is the continuing contradiction between the soaring libertarian rhetoric of the "Revolutionary Government's" reform and the reality of the repressive and dictatorial methods it uses not only to seize and preserve power but also to impose its objectives from

above. Beyond this, the mandarin bureaucracy of the Ministry of Education is a formidable obstacle to any major initiative because of, in the words of the Education Reform Commission's 1970 report, "the excessive number of functionaries and employees" and the "bureaucratization and routine [that] tend to rigidly demand the mechanical fulfillment of abstract norms that are unrelated to reality..."<sup>5</sup>

Beyond this, the political isolation of the education reform and the military regime itself stems from the peculiar manner in which the Peruvian generals and colonels have operated in power. While the military dictatorships in Brazil and Chile have freely called upon civilians to serve in many cabinet and subcabinet posts, the Peruvian military have kept almost all high public offices for generals and admirals. Thus the leadership of the Education Reform has been in the hands of bulldog army generals who have been named as Education Ministers for political and hierarchical reasons and have proven on the job to be neither the best nor the brightest of the officer corps; and a succession of army colonels who occupy the vice-ministerial posts in the ministry for one year before rotating on to higher military studies. The military have been helped by "technocratic" educational planners and philosophers grafted upon the ministerial hierarchy to design and guide the reform program toward realization. However, the technocrats have helped to sow division within the permanent ministry bureaucracy. During the first six years of the military regime there has been a rapid turnover of civilian and military personnel, except for those with long tenure in the ministry, a turnover that at times has been accelerated by fate and political exigencies. For example, the philosopher Augusto Salazar Bondy, the chief architect of the reform, died suddenly of hepatitis in December 1973. In July 1974, following the expropriation of all the Lima daily newspapers, another key planner of the Education Reform, Walter Peñalosa, was named editor of the newspaper *La Prensa*. In a country so short of high-level professional manpower, this kind of turnover and loss can scarcely be tolerated in a major policy initiative which must overcome many problems and obstacles.

In Peru's 150 years of republican life there have been several "reforms" aimed at reorganizing and reorienting the educational system. In a little book called *Via Crucis de las Reformas de la Educación Peruana*, Professor J. Wilbert Salas Rodriguez of

the University of Cuzco lists 12 "stations" of Education Reform between the 1823 Constitution and the 1972 General Education Law.<sup>6</sup> Major education statutes and decrees were legislated in 1850, 1855, 1873, 1876, 1901, 1902, 1905, 1920, 1930, 1941, 1957, and 1964. They reflected a progressive centralization of responsibility for education that gradually shifted administrative control from the Church to the municipalities to the national government. Much of the public debate during these "stations" of reform expressed anguished concern for the state of the educational system. At the same time, to solve recurrent financial crises, legislators many times organized a Mad Tea Party at which special taxes were levied to pay for the school system. For example, in 1848 a girls' secondary school, the Colegio Rosa, was founded in Puno with financial support from a new tax on the importation of mules, horses, and donkeys from Argentina.<sup>7</sup> An 1875 law provided support for primary schools, then in the hands of the municipalities, from one-tenth of the product of lands irrigated by the national or municipal governments and from a personal income tax that was never enacted, causing such financial disaster that many public schools closed between 1874 and 1879.<sup>8</sup> Meanwhile, successive educational laws became more prolix and embracing, growing from 66 articles in 1850 to 414 in 1901. Writing on previous Education Reform efforts in this century, Jorge Basadre observed:

The 1920 law, like the ones before and the 1941 law that replaced it, had one basic defect: it implied a reordering from above to those below, with dogmatic and theoretical pronouncements of a general nature without relating its content to daily reality. It belonged to the kind of "stratospheric law" that is embodied in parts of the Constitution and the Penal Code. It was a beautiful and just intellectual construction of what the obligations of the State should be to its citizens.<sup>9</sup>

The General Education Law of 1972 marks an enormous advance over the legislative and administrative patterns of previous educational reform efforts. Not only does the new law directly attack the problems of wastage and productivity in a rapidly expanding public school system; it also has provided for a badly needed administrative decentralization that has invested additional authority in the regional and zonal offices outside Lima. It is now easier to

solve routine personnel problems that for decades brought a mass migration of schoolteachers to Lima each summer to lobby and wait in the corridors of the Education Ministry. Beyond this, through the nuclearization of the school system, it has placed real power in the hands of parents and community leaders to influence the operation of the schools and see that teachers and administrative personnel fulfill their obligations. Implementation of the reform is moving along deliberately, year by year, and the new curriculum and methods have reached through the third year of primary school. There is a long way to go, however, and there are disturbing signs of conflict and confusion in the reform's execution.

The kind of problems that seem to lie ahead are dramatized in the teacher retraining program that has been central to the reform effort over the past three years. The 1970 report of the Education Reform Commission asserted that the teacher must be converted into "a lucid and critical agent of the educational process and the other structural changes initiated in the country.... The difference between the old and new educational systems, not only in its general outline but also in its conception, doctrine, ends, and means, is of such magnitude that a new type of teacher is needed, as well as infrastructure, equipment, materials, and techniques adapted to its special character."<sup>10</sup> To meet these needs the retraining of Peru's 120,000 teachers has been assigned a key role of utmost urgency. "We are trying to get the teachers to shed their old methods and habits of thought," said Augusto Salazar Bondy. "We are trying to get them to think critically, to question everything, to enrich their own and their pupils' perspective by constant discussion, to break through the old forms that made the school an instrument of domination by the ruling classes. This is the only way we can make the educational revolution."

One cannot get a feeling for the dynamics of Peru's Education Reform without comparing this rhetoric with the Dantesque indoctrination procedures by which the military regime tries to reshape the thinking of a bitter and recalcitrant mass of teachers. In 1974 I visited teacher retraining sessions in Lima and Cuzco. In the town of Sicuani (population 13,000) near Cuzco, I found about 300 teachers corralled into a single classroom to suffer through a six-week series of three-hour lectures by envoys of the Education Ministry and other government agencies. One soon concludes that these lectures have little to do with the Education Reform

and its new methods and curriculum, and that the official propaganda about questioning, criticism, and discussion boils down to supine repetition of what the lecturers have to say. Many of the lecturers are the same kind of young "promoters" who give talks to assemblies of peasants in the agrarian reform, explaining to both teachers and peasants that "Peruvian history has gone through three stages: the First Independence that lasted through prehistoric times until the Spanish Conquest in 1532; 400 years of Dependence that ended with the seizure of power by the 'Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces' on October 3, 1968, which initiated the third stage, the New Era of Peru's Second Independence." While the military regime forces the teachers to sacrifice half their vacation periods without pay so they can receive this revolutionary message, the retraining sessions in many places have become merely another political battleground between the government and SUTEP. Ironically, the new methods of imaginative thinking and questioning are being taught to the teachers by the old methods of interminable lectures, rote learning, and submission to authority. Except for an item or two of political propaganda, there is no printed material available for reading and discussion.

In August 1973, several weeks before the uprisings in Arequipa, Puno, and Cuzco, a major disturbance occurred in Sicuani involving SUTEP and the secondary students. Edgar Figueroa, a teacher in the local Instituto Agropecuario who doubled as a rural organizer for SINAMOS, began attacking the other teachers as "counterrevolutionary" on his twice-weekly program on the Sicuani radio station. In response the teachers demanded his silencing or dismissal, but the major in charge of the Sicuani army garrison backed Figueroa and the teachers' demand was ignored. The teachers went on strike. They staged a sit-in at the zonal offices of the Education Ministry while secondary students seized the gas stations at either end of town and felled trees to block the railroad tracks and the roads that were Sicuani's only link to the outside world. The mobilization of the secondary students in Sicuani, as a few months later in the larger cities of the southern sierra, was the first time students below the university level were involved in large-scale street actions in Peruvian politics. The conflict ended when Figueroa was transferred to an office job in Cuzco. According to one secondary schoolteacher whom I met while attending the retraining course in Sicuani, "we all act as if we are prisoners of this

society. The teacher feels that he is economically marginal. He does not have a political view of reality, but wants to earn more because he sees that the military earn more money and do less work. At the same time, the SINAMOS rural organizers are creating conflicts between parents and teachers. The SINAMOS people say we're not doing our job, and tell the parents that they must report us to the authorities if we are absent from school."

"The teachers hate the military and are against the government," said an elderly school administrator who headed the retraining course in Sicuani. "They want more pay, and that's all they're interested in. At the same time, the people who come to lecture here often are badly trained. We don't have anyone capable of explaining the new language and math curriculum to the teachers. The new teaching materials sent us from Lima were not enough and arrived late. We even lack stencils and paper to reproduce the lectures given the teachers. The retrainers come from Lima with very general ideas on politics and the new Peruvian society, while the teachers are angered by the fact that the retrainers earn much higher salaries than they do."

An internal progress report on the Education Reform drafted by the ministry's regional office in Cuzco highlighted the following problems: "limited time for teacher retraining; late receipt of maintenance stipends of teachers being retrained [about \$35 for the entire six-week period for those living away from home]; the teachers' lack of reading habits; resistance by some teachers to the present changes; manipulation by SUTEP to obstruct the reform in Zone 54 (Sicuani), conditioning cooperation with the reform to the teachers' economic demands; interference by officials in Lima; lack of retraining personnel; frequent use of the old methodology by the retrained teachers; resistance by parents."

While Peru still is far from realizing "Revolutionary Government's" rhetorical pretension of creating "a social democracy of full participation,"<sup>11</sup> the agrarian and education reforms have greatly intensified the interaction between Lima and the provinces, and between the departmental capitals and the countryside. To appreciate both the impact and enormous difficulty of these governmental initiatives, we must view these changes taking place in the remote and backward regions of the sierra that, until recently, were wrapped in the

mantle of feudalism and almost universal illiteracy. Just as feudalism and illiteracy went together in Peru's stagnant past, peasant revolt, land reform and the expansion of schooling are inseparable elements of her dynamic present. Several weeks after my visit to the teacher retraining sessions in Sicuani, I returned to the Cuzco region to see the related processes of land and education reform in operation in a setting where both the difficulties and the achievements can be much more easily understood.

### III

The community of Huaracocondo is nestled at the northwest edge of the Pampa de Anta, where the broad, windblown plain—flooded for much of the year—begins to rise into the Andean hills in subsistence patches that form a softly-varied quilt of browns and greens. The village itself, where nearly half the district's population of 6,198 lives, is a classic mountain settlement of narrow, stone-paved streets lined by adobe houses descending gradually toward the plain. Smoke filters upward through the awkwardly drooping tile roofs in the early mornings as cows, burros, and sheep amble along the streets toward the fields. The village plaza is dominated by a colonial church in acute disrepair, with a badly tilted stone belfry, a sunken roof, and long-faded whitewash on its massive adobe walls. Indian peasants in frayed ponchos and floppy sheepskin hats emerge from the early morning mists typical of harvest time. Bent by huge burdens of cornstalks tied to their backs, they cross the Plaza de Armas in single file like the obeisant sheaves of misery in Joseph's dream.

Huaracocondo was in the heartland of the Inca empire, only 25 miles from the ancient capital of Cuzco. Anta's soggy plain, the centerpiece of this scene, was as much a problem for the Incas as it is for today's agrarian reform engineers. The Spanish chronicler Pedro Cieza de León reported in 1553: "The water of a river that rises near this valley forms a deep bog which would be very difficult to cross without a broad and solid highway such as the Incas ordered built, with walls on either side that will last for a long time."<sup>12</sup> Because of its water, wind, and clayey soil, the lush-looking Pampa de Anta has never been arable. Severe frosts occur throughout July and August on the basin floor, 12,700 feet above sea level. On the nearby upland puna, land must lie fallow between 10 and 25 years.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, corn and some wheat grow in the protected crevices

of the mountains, and potatoes on the colder heights. Loose clusters of eucalyptus trees and reddish tile roofs show the dispersion of rural settlement. Before the land reform, 80 per cent of the district's land was in haciendas.<sup>14</sup> The rural day wage has been rising from about US\$.08 in 1958 to US\$.70 today. The breakup of the hacienda system in Huarcocondo was hastened by a series of peasant uprisings and land invasions in the mid-1960s, organized by the Trotskyite leader, Vlademiro Valer, who is now head of rural operations in the Cuzco region for SINAMOS. The total population of Huarcocondo, as shown by censuses in 1940 and 1772, has remained virtually the same. Baum observes that "the migration of those between 15 and 30 years old is virtually total."<sup>15</sup> They migrate mainly to the nearby tropical valley of La Convención—where a major peasant movement was led by Hugo Blanco, Valer's brother-in-law—as well as to the cities of Cuzco and the coast. In the early 1960s the Club Social Huarcocondino of Lima donated a band of musical instruments to the *núcleo escolar* of the home village.<sup>16</sup> "The instruments long ago have disappeared from the school," said the government-appointed mayor, Jorge Velasco Cochán, who participated both in the La Convención and Huarcocondo uprisings. "But we used the cornets for the invasions of the haciendas."

At a corner of the Plaza de Armas of Huarcocondo there is a small *fonda*, or eating-house, with long wooden tables and an earthen floor; in recent years it has been prospering with the patronage of *mestizo* government functionaries who roam the countryside and crowd the tables at mealtimes: agrarian reform engineers, literacy workers, policemen, SINAMOS promoters, schoolteachers, cooperative organizers, etc. When the Education Reform came to Huarcocondo two years ago, the community already was part of one of the most complex land reform undertakings of the military regime. Some 68 expropriated haciendas and their peons, 37 Indian communities and 170 small farmers were joined into a single production unit, the Cooperativa Antapampa, embracing more than 5,000 peasant families and 80,000 acres of land, of which only 5,000 acres can be cropped and another 25,000 acres can be used as low-grade natural pasture. I visited the Antapampa project in 1970 during the early stages of planning and expropriation.<sup>17</sup> When I returned four years later I found this huge cooperative in deep trouble because of the shortage of fertile land, the extremely poor communications—owing to the mountains and

bogs—among the cooperative's member communities, and the distance and distrust between the cooperative's rank and file members and its managers and directors.

According to an internal SINAMOS report, there was "lack of training of members in all aspects and levels of the cooperative; rejection of the cooperative effort within the Revolutionary process; divisions and rivalries between the advisers and heads of the production units; groups linked to political parties seeking to benefit politically from the cooperative effort; distrust toward the agrarian reform caused by low production and faulty marketing, generating a negative attitude.... On the technical side, the cooperative is not rationally managed, with carelessness in the harvesting, underemployment of men and machines, payment of unjustified salaries, deficient marketing practices and a lack of programming and control. On the financial side, the cooperative will not be able to meet its loan payments."<sup>18</sup>

The peasants readily express their bitterness over these shortcomings. Mamerto Huallpa Quintanilla, the community president, said that less than one-third of Huarcocondo's *comuneros* have joined the cooperative. "Most of our *comuneros* have yet to be convinced that they would benefit from joining the cooperative," he added. "We are demanding an accounting of the cooperative's finances, but the 1972 books still have not been balanced. We know that Antapampa is near collapse. Its funding is based on crop loans that are not repaid when the harvest comes in. They say there's a profit but it's really all government loans. The president of the cooperative spends all his time in Cuzco and never visits the member communities. The peasants complain to me that they have to wait from three to six months to collect a day's wages. For this reason they refuse to do any more work for the cooperative. Last year's potato crop was ruined by a fungus after the harvest because it was improperly stored. The Cooperative Antapampa is composed of three zones—Anta, Zurita, and Huarcocondo. We of Huarcocondo want to break away from Antapampa and form a smaller communal coop, but the agrarian reform office in Cuzco won't let us."

Long before Huarcocondo became a theater of agrarian reform, the community was deeply involved in the educational expansion and experimentation of the past three decades. According to



the 1940 census, only one-sixth of Huarcocondo's school-age population (six to 14) and one-tenth of those 15 or older had ever been to school. However, by 1962, 60 per cent of the school-age children were enrolled.<sup>19</sup> When Huarcocondo's *núcleo escolar campesino* was formed in 1956, there already were 17 classroom teachers working in the district and an enrollment of 536 pupils in what was to become the central school of the *núcleo*. The pupils "were crowded into four classrooms that lacked adequate lighting, enough seats, and other artifacts considered essential. Nevertheless, the limited facilities and resources were accepted over time by the people of the district. Some of the principal members of the community believe that, although the old school lacked some things, it did a better job than the *núcleo*."<sup>20</sup>

A similarly critical view was expressed to me this year by Mamerto Huallpa. "I have two kids in the *núcleo* school," he said. "In the fifth year of primary our kids can't write a decent letter, whereas when we reached the third grade we had learned Spanish and could read and write. Many teachers simply don't teach well. They live in Cuzco and arrive late in the morning. When they're on strike, the children's learning is affected."

Most of the pupils of the *núcleo* attend the eight satellite schools deeper into the countryside. According to Baum,

... the satellite schools are located between 30 minutes and four hours from the central school, either on foot or horseback. They are in settlements of roughly 300 persons who live away from the urban centers of the sierra. The school represents the only formal and constant contact the people have with the institutions of government. These communities are occasionally visited by members of the Civil Guard and the parish priest. But these visits are infrequent and very formal, which makes a close relationship with the community very difficult. It seems that the only institution that effectively exists is the school with its teachers. Consequently, through its action and not through other organizations that in reality do not exist, the major changes would take place on the *puna*. Helping the teachers of the satellite school is the director of the *núcleo* and its supervisors. The program of visits to each

satellite is planned a month in advance at the *nucleo* office in Huarcocondo. Each satellite is visited by the director or one of the three supervisors at least once every two weeks. These visits often involve a meeting with the *comuneros* to discuss some new point in the program, such as the distribution of eucalyptus trees or the building of new facilities for the school. . . . The teacher in the satellite school often has no professional degree and thus cannot teach in the central school. His or her life is very difficult and without dedication or desire to continue teaching until retirement. Many teachers dislike their jobs. They were forced to go to the *punas* for the only job they could get. Generally, theirs is a solitary life apart from the community in which they make little effort to fulfill or improve the supervisors' plans. Unfortunately for the school and community, the best teachers do not stay for more than two or three years. The teacher's life on the *puna* is tranquil and unsupervised by the authorities of the *núcleo*. The schools are often closed. Sometimes the teacher has taken the pupils on an excursion at a considerable distance from the school. Other times the teacher is absent and the school does not function.<sup>21</sup>

At the satellite school of Huayllacacha, about an hour's walk from the village of Huarcocondo, the Education Reform arrived two years ago in a flurry of colorful new textbooks and classroom placards announcing the new curriculum and the hope for a new attitude toward education. Following orders from the regional headquarters of the Education Ministry in Cuzco, Huarcocondo's *Núcleo Escolar Campesino* was merged with the older *núcleo* in the neighboring village of Zurite to form a larger *Núcleo Escolar Comunal* (NEC), embracing a total of 21 rural primary schools with 76 teachers and 3,275 pupils. The directors of the old *núcleos* were rival candidates for the new directorship, to be appointed by the ministry from a slate of three candidates chosen by an assembly of teachers, parents, and local authorities. But the Huarcocondo director, a native of Puno, withdrew from the competition at the last minute and threw his support to his rival. "I realized that the other fellow had more courses in educational administration, and he would be sure to be picked by the ministry," he said. "This way we agreed that I would remain director of the *subnúcleo* in Huarcocondo."

The NEC's new director in Zurite, also a young man with the convivial manner of a skillful politician, explained that "traditional Peruvian education was memory-oriented, stressing reading and writing. With the Education Reform the child will have a new series of educational experiences to develop new lines of activity. We want children to learn how to reason and criticize. Parents at first are disappointed because the children don't begin learning the alphabet immediately. The first grade begins with drawing exercises so the pupils learn how to use a pencil and other classroom materials. After six weeks of this preliminary work they begin the new *Amigos* reader, which teaches them complete words before they learn individual letters. With the Reform, there are no failures and no child repeats the year's work."<sup>22</sup>

The *Amigos* reader focuses on subject matter that would be familiar to any small town or country child, expressed in simple words and richly colored illustrations that are reproduced on placards that are hung on the walls of all the first-grade classrooms in Peru.

Much less promising of success are the new mathematics texts, which try to teach modern math, substituting the standard arithmetical operations with games comparing geometrical forms. The teachers complain that they do not understand the new teaching methods, and that the teacher retraining sessions that were supposed to instruct them in handling the new curriculum was so overloaded with political indoctrination that there was no time for learning these unfamiliar methodologies. In the satellite school of Huayllacacha, one young teacher told me: "The texts for modern math arrived in the

second half of the school year. A child needs a great deal of reasoning power to solve these modern math problems, yet in the rural areas the diet is very poor and children don't usually have the energy and attention span to deal with these problems. As the math lessons progress, the problems become more difficult. These lessons were developed among middle class pupils in the experimental schools of Lima, and are very hard to apply in rural areas. In this area the children's diet is *mote* (corn boiled in water), noodles, beans, and potatoes, and they have a lighter meal at night of some combination of the same food. They usually don't eat at mid-day. We used to have a school lunch program at Huayllacacha, but that ended with the Alliance for Progress. Under the Reform, there's less pressure on the children to learn Spanish fast. We must treat the Quechua children very gently to overcome their feelings of shame and inferiority. We teach entirely in Quechua in the first year and sing Quechua songs. We show them familiar objects and have them recite their names in Quechua and then in Spanish. Now the children don't learn to read and write in the first year. We try to explain to their parents that they will learn in two or three years. We don't conduct classes entirely in Spanish until the fourth grade."

The school at Huayllacacha is about 30 years old. A large part of the community used to be part of the Hacienda Huaypa Chico of the Romainville family, one of the principal landlords of the Cuzco region, whose Hacienda Santa Rosa in the La Convención Valley was the scene of one of the most important peasant revolts of the past decade. In the 1960s, under the *Cooperación Popular* program of President Fernando Belaunde Terry (1963-1968), the old

---

#### Extract from the *Amigos* Reader

|                                |                               |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| viene la gallina.              | the hen comes.                |
| vienen los pollitos.           | the chicks come.              |
| vienen a comer maíz.           | they come to eat corn.        |
| el gallo y la gallina          | the cock and the hen          |
| vienen a comer maíz.           | come to eat corn.             |
| mi gallina viene a comer maíz. | my hen comes to eat corn.     |
| el conejo no come maíz.        | the rabbit does not eat corn. |

school of Huayllacacha was greatly expanded into six classrooms, now accommodating 308 pupils. As in most *Cooperación Popular* projects, the peasants built the adobe walls of the new classrooms and the government contributed the windows, roof, concrete floors, doors, and blackboards. The school day is supposed to begin at 9 A.M., but both pupils and teachers straggle in at about 9:30 and classes don't begin until around 10 o'clock. On the morning I visited the school, the director's office had been broken into the night before and papers, notebooks, and records were strewn over the floor.

"This is the first time this has happened here," another teacher said. "The parents, however, have become indifferent to the school. They don't show up anymore for communal work on fences and the school's vegetable plot, nor will they make furniture for the classrooms. It is hard for the teachers to live in the community because there's always a problem with food. The peasant women are too busy in the fields to cook for us. They live almost entirely on potatoes and *chuño*, and are not accustomed to meat. So the teachers must find food and cook for themselves, as well as find a place to sleep. Also, friction has developed between the parents and teachers. The press, radio, and SINAMOS stimulate hatred toward the teachers. The *comuneros* think we are rich because we earn a salary, thus we are always reminded of class differences. The parents always complain about our absences, but the only times they show up at the school are for enrollment and the ceremonies closing the school year. Between those days there is much laxness. In the old days, the teachers had to go from house to house at four or five o'clock in the morning to recruit people for communal tasks at the school. To improve our rural schools, the teachers must live in the community, know the *comuneros*, and convince them of the benefits of education. I have worked in rural areas ever since I graduated from the Tupac Amaru Normal School in Tinta. I had worked for awhile on the coast, near Tarma, but I returned to the sierra because I'm supporting two brothers at the University of Cuzco. It cost too much for me to live on the coast and still send money to my brothers at the university. It's much cheaper to live in the sierra."

One of the early achievements of the Education Reform is said to be a sharp reduction of teachers' absences in rural schools because parents have been encouraged to keep tabs on the teachers and have a certain leverage over local school authorities through the election of the *núcleo* director. At the

central school of the Huarcocondo *subnúcleo*, as elsewhere, this new vigilance has generated resentment among the teachers. Most of Huarcocondo's teachers arrive in the morning on the slow train that descends from Cuzco past the great ruins of Machu Picchu toward the town of Quillabamba in the tropical valley of La Convención. To catch the 6 A.M. train, which is Huarcocondo's main connection with the outside world, the teachers must awaken in Cuzco at five and often do not return home until 8 P.M. They make this sacrifice in order to live with their families and to avoid the trouble and expense of maintaining two households. This kind of commuting, which places great stress upon both the teachers and the school, is one of many signs of the intensified communications between the city and countryside in recent years, yet it seems to contribute to the slackness and absences that have become legend in Peruvian education.


In Huarcocondo the teachers, like the peasants, are critical of the government, but for different reasons. Teachers express their resentment largely in terms of the pressures from parents and the new professional demands on them generated by the Education Reform. A young fifth-grade teacher, who brings her eight-year-old son with her on the daily commute from Cuzco, explained that "the Education Reform has made the parents into watchdogs of the teachers. When a teacher is absent or late, the parents complain to the zonal office in Cuzco and the *jefes* there take action.

"This is a pre-peasant government that favors the *campesino*, and anything they say is right. While there is a great deal of propaganda about free discussion in the Education Reform, it is really taboo for us to talk politics, challenge authority, or to criticize. The parents complain to us that their children should start reading as soon as they enter school, but the reform manuals say they must start at a later point in the learning process. Our six-week retraining courses, which all teachers are forced to attend as their schools are brought into the reform, are conducted very hastily with emphasis on politics and 'conscientization' of the teachers. We teachers asked instead for practical demonstrations on how the new curriculum should be applied in rural areas. As it turned out, there was almost no retraining time spent on the new teaching techniques and the new manuals and materials arrived late in the school year. But the *jefes* say all is going well."



## NOTES

1. Quoted in the magazine *CARETAS* (No. 489, Lima: December 10-20, 1973). Very little reporting on these events appeared in Peru's controlled press. For the best accounts, see *CARETAS*, Nos. 488 and 489 and the British newsweekly *Latin America*, Vol. VII, Nos. 46 and 48 (November 16 and 30, 1973). Also see César Hildebrandt's "Entrevista en la Clandestinidad: Habla Victor Manzur, Secretario General del SUTEP," in *CARETAS*, No. 487, November 8, 1973, pp. 22-4.
2. For an account of the 1971 strike and the deportations, see César Hildebrandt, "Extraños Extrañamientos," *CARETAS*, No. 443, September 20, 1971, p. 8. Hugo Blanco led the most important peasant uprising of the 1960s, in the La Convención Valley near Cuzco, and had been jailed for nearly seven years following his arrest in May 1963. Shortly after his release he became involved in the teachers' movement. He now lives in Sweden.
3. Quoted in *CARETAS*, No. 489, December 10, 1973, p. 8.
4. While APRA in the 1930s and the present teachers' movement involve politically emergent *mestizo* groups, the main difference lies in that APRA was backed in its early years by local landowners and merchants in its base area of northern Peru. For a fuller explanation, see Peter Klaren, *La Formación de las Haciendas Azucareras y los Orígenes del APRA*, Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1970.
5. Ministry of Education, *Reforma de la Educación Peruana: Informe General*, Lima, 1970 (heretofore referred to as *Informe*), pp. 20-1.
6. J. Wilbert Salas Rodríguez, *Vía Crucis de las Reformas de la Educación Peruana*, Cuzco, 1970.
7. Jorge Basadre, *Historia de la República del Perú*, Sixth Edition. Lima: Editorial Universitaria, 1969, Vol. III, p. 250.
8. *Ibid.*, VII, pp. 117-9.
9. *Ibid.*, XV, p. 95.
10. *Informe*, p. 154.
11. This phrase is taken from President Velasco's annual message, July 28, 1974, and occurs in many other official pronouncements.
12. Pedro Cieza de León, *The Incas* (1553). Translated by Harriet de Onis. Edited with an introduction by Victor Wolfgang von Hagen. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959, p. 135.
13. See Lynn Williams, *Land Use Intensity and Farm Size: Traditional Agriculture in Cuzco, Peru*. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Geography Department, University of Kansas, pp. 14 and 19. Williams was a Peace Corps volunteer in the Anta region before returning for his doctoral field research. Also see Isaiah Bowman, *The Andes of Southern Peru*, New York: Henry Holt, 1916.
14. John Baum, *Los Núcleos Escolares Campesinos*. Second Edition. Mexico, 1967, p. 82. I rely heavily on this perceptive essay for data on the social and economic background of Huarcocondo and the pre-reform operation of its *núcleo escolar*.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
16. This is one of the myriad clubs formed in Lima by migrants from the same provincial community or town. See William Mangin, "The role of regional associations in the adaptation of rural population in Peru," *Sociologus* 9:21-36 (1959). Also Paul L. Doughty, "La cultura del regionalismo en la vida urbana de Lima, Perú," *América Indígena*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Mexico, 1969, pp. 949-82.
17. See my "Peru's Ambitious Land Reform Plan," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 8, 1971 (editorial page).
18. SINAMOS, *Plan Tentativo de Acciones a Realizarse en la Cooperativa Agraria de Producción "Tupac Amaru II" de Antapampa Ltda. 106* (mimeographed). Cuzco, August 1973.
19. Baum, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 106 and 110.
22. Article 100 of the 1972 General Education Law (Decree-Law No. 19326) reads: "The promotion from grade to grade is not necessarily tied to chronological fixed periods. The students may be promoted to the immediately upper grade automatically when they have achieved experiences and educational content which constitute the corresponding minimum requisites. Therefore, repetition of the grade is excluded."



# Peru's Education Reform

## Part IV: "A Social Democracy of Full Participation"

by Norman Gall



### PERU

Peru's educational system can now challenge the army's traditional role as the only truly national institution. Its expansion has been the single consistent expression of social democracy in Peru's recent history. The Reform's bold strategy still must be invested with the assent and coherence needed to rationalize the explosive growth of schooling.

[NG-6-74]

Fieldstaff Reports

American  
Universities  
Field Staff

Despite the deficiencies that have been discussed at length in these Reports, Peru's educational system has developed to where it can challenge the army's traditional role as the only truly national institution and, at times, can serve as a counterpoise to the army's political power. The expansion of public education has been the single clear and consistent expression of social democracy in Peru's recent history, growing both in impact and momentum throughout the course of this century. It has served Peru well in incorporating into citizenship submerged and subject elements of the population; it has acted as a vehicle for the development of social skills and mobility and as a force for the integration of Peruvian society through the teaching of Spanish. Not everyone would agree with these goals, nor have they been fully achieved. Nevertheless, the Indian rebellions and the recent abolition of serfdom in the Peruvian sierra could not have happened without the expansion of schooling that preceded and accompanied these movements to reach at least some elements of the peasantry. In Jose Maria Arguedas's classic novel, *Todas las Sangres*, the *mestizo* townspeople of San Pedro urgently hold a meeting to prevent the Indian community of Lahuaymarca from opening a school. "In this we are different from the Indians," the mayor of San Pedro told his fellow citizens. "If these animals learn to read and write, what will they not want to do and ask for next?"<sup>1</sup>

With their modest and overcommitted resources of skilled manpower, Peru's schools seem to be absorbed in the same process described by Richard Hofstadter for the educational expansion in the United States over the past century. "In its pursuit of an adequate supply of well-trained teachers, the nation is caught in a kind of academic treadmill," Hofstadter wrote. "The more adequate the rewards become in the upper echelons of education—in the colleges and junior colleges—and the higher the proportion of the young population that attends such institutions, the greater their capacity becomes to pull talent out of the lower levels of the system. It remains difficult to find enough trained talent to educate large masses in a society that does not make teaching attractive."<sup>2</sup> In Peruvian education, the task at hand is to invest the bold and yet reasonable strategy of Education Reform with the assent and coherence needed to rationalize the explosive growth of schooling in recent decades. Concretely speaking, this means motivating teachers, realistically adapting curriculum to

specific needs and developing the educational manpower needed for the new kind of secondary education. The ESEPs (Escuela Superior de Educación Profesional), that would train young people for specialized occupations in an expanding economy instead of sending them on to float without purpose or direction in an already clogged university system that seems capable only of producing ever-increasing quantities of ill-trained candidates for bureaucratic employment. One of the principal strategists of the Education Reform, Walter Peñaloza, wrote recently that discrimination against this kind of professional, middle-level education would not exist because "entry into the ESEPs would be required of all who complete basic (primary) education.... These middle-level programs (*carreras cortas*) will no longer be reputed to be for the least-qualified young people because all will be obliged to enroll in them."<sup>3</sup> In this way, Peñaloza added, Peru would hope to harmonize its educational system with the needs of the economy and to reduce the blockage and frustration familiar to most Latin American systems:

Uruguay has expanded secondary education considerably, but this has made the blockage to university enrollment more acute. A similar situation exists in Costa Rica and Panamá. In the case of Guatemala, Brazil, and, in part, Bolivia, we find secondary education insufficiently developed and, on the other hand, a substantial expansion of university enrollments. This means that the relatively few secondary students, already privileged by having climbed so far, become much more privileged by their easy access to the university. The elitist character of these systems is thus strongly outlined.<sup>4</sup>

These shortcomings and frustrations have led to a great deal of talk in recent years about the futility of schooling in Latin America, inspired largely by the work of Ivan Illich, the brilliant Roman Catholic dissenter whose influence as an advocate of "deschooling society" has spread throughout the world. Operating from bases in Puerto Rico and Cuernavaca, Mexico, Illich has greatly influenced the issues and language of the educational debate in Latin America. Like some of his "deschooling society" followers, Illich is the product of an elite education at leading universities.<sup>5</sup> Some of his critics have called Illich a man with seven degrees kicking down the ladder up which he climbed. However, among those who have acknowledged his

influence were Augusto Salazar Bondy, the late philosopher-architect of Peru's Education Reform, and Mariano Baptista Gumucio, Bolivia's former Education Minister. Baptista in 1970 invited Illich to La Paz to lecture President Alfredo Ovando and his assembled cabinet. After leaving office Baptista published a pair of books entitled *Salvemos a Bolivia de la Escuela* (1971) and *La Educación como Forma de Suicidio Nacional* (1973). Bolivia has one of Latin America's most impoverished and overburdened educational systems. Since the 1962 Revolution, which abolished serfdom, Bolivia nevertheless has managed to increase the enrollment rate of primary school-age children (six to 14) from about 15 to 58 per cent by 1970. With population growing by 2.8 per cent annually over the past two decades, this has meant a sevenfold increase in primary enrollments. It would be hard to persuade those Bolivians who have gained access to schools since the revolution that education is a form of national suicide.<sup>6</sup>

Illich's personal charisma and trendy rhetoric have made him one of the Beautiful People. A sampler of his arguments sounds something like this:

I have chosen the school as my paradigm [to] show that the institutionalization of values leads inevitably to physical pollution, social polarization and psychological impotence: three dimensions in a process of global degradation and modernized misery.<sup>7</sup>

School combines the expectations of the consumer expressed in its ritual. It is a liturgical expression of a worldwide "cargo cult," reminiscent of the cults which swept Melanesia in the forties, which injected cultists with the belief if they but put a black tie over their naked torsos, Jesus would arrive in a steamer bearing an icebox, a pair of trousers and a sewing machine for each believer.<sup>8</sup>

For generations we have tried to make the world a better place by providing more and more schooling, but so far the endeavor has failed. What we have learned instead is that forcing all children to climb an open-ended education ladder cannot enhance equality but must favor the individual who starts out earlier, healthier, or better prepared; that

enforced instruction deadens for most people the will for independent learning; and that knowledge treated as a commodity, delivered in packages, and accepted as private property once it is acquired must always be scarce.<sup>9</sup>

Before poor nations could reach [the] point of universal schooling... their ability to educate would be exhausted. Even 10 or 12 years of schooling are beyond 85 per cent of all men of our century if they happen to live outside the tiny islands where capital accumulates. Nowhere in Latin America do 27 per cent of any age group get beyond the sixth grade [*except Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Cuba, Costa Rica, author's note, N.G.*], nor do more than one per cent graduate from a university. Yet no government spends less than 18 per cent of its budget on schools, and many [*only Bolivia, author's note, N.G.*] spend more than 30 per cent. Universal schooling, as this concept has been defined recently in industrial societies, is obviously beyond their means.... For instance, the trade school is sometimes advocated as a cure-all for mass schooling. Yet it is doubtful that the products of trade schools would find employment in a continuously changing, ever more automated economy. Moreover, the capital and operating costs of trade schools as we know them today, are several times as high as those for a standard school on the same grade.... Guerrilla warfare in Latin America is another educational device much more frequently misused or misunderstood than applied. Che Guevara, for instance, clearly saw it as a last educational resort to teach a people about the illegitimacy of their political system. Especially in unschooled countries, where the transistor radio has come to every village, we must never underrate the educational functions of great charismatic dissidents like Dom Helder Camara in Brazil or Camilo Torres in Colombia. Castro described his early charismatic harangues as teaching sessions.<sup>10</sup>

In the name of God we must denounce the idolatry of progress, the constant escalation of production which pollutes our planet. We must expose the pseudo-theology of a kind of "education" that only prepares its pupils


for a life of frustrating consumption. We must remind men that God has created a good world and has given us the power to know and cherish it without the need of an intermediary.... A world that curbs unrestrained technology is necessarily a world that puts radical limits on consumption—limits arrived at by agreement among a vast majority and ultimately in the interest of all. It makes no sense to propose a minimum income unless you define a maximum one—nobody can ever get enough who does not know what is enough. It makes no sense to advocate minimum levels of health care, transport, and access to tools unless you define maximum levels of medical treatment, speed, and bigness. An anti-technocratic consensus such as I envision translates easily into the need for voluntary poverty as it was preached by the Lord.<sup>11</sup>

Illich is absolutely right in identifying the basic problem as one of rationalization of consumption. In Peru, schooling not only has been associated with rising levels of personal consumption, but also has proven in the past to be a prelude of more to come.<sup>12</sup> Like many other "radical" proposals, however, Illich's curious mixture of monkish and revolutionary rhetoric, while raising fundamental questions, invites reactionary and retrograde solutions. Is there no distinction to be made between income levels and educational need in the United States—where excessive personal consumption has generated an exaggerated individualism that both undermines the cohesion of society and places heavy pressure on the world's resource base—and those in a country like Peru, where millions of people have sought education as a vehicle of striving to emerge from feudal bondage and a subsistence agricultural economy? Shall the "open-ended education ladder"—Jacob's ladder, if you will—be accessible only, as before, to graduates (like Illich) of the University of Salzburg and Rome's Gregorian University, and to the children of landlords and merchants and bankers and bishops? Or shall we, as Illich urges, abolish schooling entirely, and with it the organized transmission between generations of accumulated knowledge and experience, leaving us free to live by faith alone? One of the main questions posed by Illich really is whether we shall continue to live in complex societies as long as we can survive, a question that seems to have been decided long ago. The

real question for Peru, and many other countries, is how much longer can its economy support growing educational consumption without a corresponding increase in productive skills?

This consumption has been rising rapidly. In a major study of income distribution in Peru, Richard Webb describes a "commercial revolution" in the sierra characterized by "a rapid increase in the movement of money, goods, and people. This has been accompanied by changes which precede or accompany income growth, such as the creation of physical infrastructure (particularly roads and urban facilities) and the spread of schooling."<sup>13</sup> While Webb notes little income redistribution between the modern and traditional sectors of the Peruvian economy in the 1961-1970 period, education was the only area of income measurement to show a large general increase per worker, rising by two-thirds in the modern sector and by 250 per cent in traditional rural areas.<sup>14</sup> "The growth of towns, the impressive increase in savings deposits, the expansion of the road system and of vehicle traffic, and the relative increase in the nonfarm labor force in the sierra all suggest growing *urban* incomes.... The urban population also has been the principal beneficiary of the growth in the government sector, most notably during the 1960s. The influx of educational, health, police, and rural development personnel has raised government payrolls chiefly in provincial and district capitals. Public sector employees enjoy relatively high incomes by provincial standards, and their salaries rose steadily in real terms throughout the period. Average town incomes have thus been raised by the compositional effect of the government component, and by local multiplier effects of the government payroll."<sup>15</sup> Webb argues persuasively that the reforms carried out by the Belaunde and Velasco regimes have almost exclusively benefited workers in the modern sector (factories, mines, fisheries, industrialized farms, etc.), while the traditional peasantry has benefited much less in real terms, largely through land redistribution and the spread of schooling. Can any other result be reasonably expected, given the extreme scarcity both of land and trained manpower in the Peruvian sierra? Within these givens, should Peru's small economic surplus be spent on income redistribution or on creating new factors of production? The desperate need for greater productivity is reflected in the design of the Education Reform.





Going to school in the Pueblo Joven of Collique, Lima (1974).

Without rising productivity, Peruvian education will be engulfed by escalating economic and demographic pressures. Of 19 Latin American countries, Peru ranks sixth (behind Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Panama, and Costa Rica) in the coverage extended to the school-age population by the educational system.<sup>16</sup> Peru's achievement in this field in recent years is all the more dramatic when we consider that the five countries with greater coverage have per capita incomes averaging nearly twice Peru's \$438 in 1970, and in the 1960s had population growth rates nearly one-third less than Peru's 3.2 per cent. In addition, all five countries have long-established school systems serving ethnically-integrated populations, unburdened by racial problems such as Peru's historic prejudice against the Indian.

In recent years teachers' salaries have absorbed 95 per cent of Peru's education budget, compared with 71 per cent of total recurrent costs in African countries, 73 per cent in Asian countries, and 72 per cent in Latin America.<sup>17</sup> Discussing the interaction between fertility trends and the "impressive" growth of schooling in developing countries, Gavin W. Jones has written:

Although fertility may rise slightly during the next few years in some less developed countries, partly because of lowered disease and death rates, the more common trend will almost certainly be downward.... At current fertility and mortality levels, the *potential* impact of lowered fertility in reducing the increments to the school-age




Figure 1. Proportion of national income spent on public education as a function of per capita GNP for 62 selected countries with per capita GNP below \$700.

population is substantially greater than that of lowered mortality in raising them, because in most cases death rates are already low while fertility remains high. The extent to which this potential will be realized will depend on the speed and timing of the reductions in fertility and mortality.... Rising school attendance rates result, after a lag, in a rise in the level of education among the adult population, and this contributes to the decline in fertility in a number of ways, none of them completely independent of general socioeconomic development. On the personal level, educated couples are more likely to evaluate rationally the pros and cons of an extra birth, and perhaps be less concerned about the various taboos, cultural and religious, on the use of birth control. They also may understand more clearly the conflicts between "quantity" and "quality"

in the raising of children... Through their education they may have developed heightened aspirations and acquired new desires apart from child rearing, some of which directly conflict with child rearing. For example, mobility, which is restricted by a large family, is needed to realize fully the economic and "social status" benefits flowing from education. Whatever the motivation, there is no question that in the developing countries, better educated couples have fewer children and use contraception more than couples with little or no education.<sup>18</sup>

Population growth is one of the three major variables that will shape Peru's future educational development. The second is the degree to which Peru will continue to develop her mineral and agricultural resources to sustain physical growth and qualitative development; and the third is the degree of political stability, coherence, and assent that can be mustered by the military regime and its successors. Apart from the international renown won by Peru's "Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces" for its nationalist economic policies and its efforts at social reform, one of the military regime's major achievements—often overlooked—has been its ability to keep Peru's economy afloat and on course while both carrying out major reforms and reorganizing the economy along statist lines. By contrast, in neighboring Chile, the Marxist regime of President Salvador Allende, with a much larger pool of technicians, wrecked Chile's economy while carrying out a much less ambitious reform program than Peru's. If a major share of Peru's mining, oil, and irrigation projects are realized by the end of this decade, she may find herself—world economic conditions permitting—riding a boom in commodity exports that would pay for continued educational expansion and much more. Nevertheless, as Abraham Lowenthal explained recently, the Velasco regime is in serious political trouble:

Despite its international stature, the Peruvian regime finds itself almost bereft of conspicuous support at home. No group is likely soon to displace or even seriously challenge the military, but the government encounters concerted opposition within many important sectors: labor, business, peasants, students and professionals; one election after another reflects anti-regime

sentiment. Some backing, particularly among the urban poor and among highland peasants who have benefited already from the agrarian reform, is demonstrated from time to time, but contradictory indications are more apparent. General strikes in several provincial areas forced the regime to suspend constitutional guarantees temporarily in mid-1973 and again later that year. SINAMOS, established in 1971 partly to organize support for the government, has instead been the object of intensifying attack from all sides, even from within the regime. And middle class distress is especially perceptible.<sup>19</sup>

The generals and colonels are pained by their growing political isolation and by the failure of their speechwriters and publicity machine to win them enthusiastic popular support. This was intensely dramatized by the abortive police strike in February 1975 in which the Army stormed police headquarters where the strikers were barricaded, killing 100 persons in the attack and in clearing the downtown Lima streets of looters who had sacked the stores, according to official sources. On top of this, President Velasco, whose leg was amputated two years ago, reportedly suffered a stroke in late January and has been convalescing ever since. Apart from the recent tensions over confrontations and succession, part of the military's frustration may be explained by traditional Peruvian attitudes of political caution and passivity, cultivated throughout 150 years of republican life by alternations between military regimes that permitted no suffrage and civilian regimes chosen by a tiny electorate limited in number by literacy requirements, and until recently readily deliverable by political bosses. But Peru has awakened sufficiently in recent decades to be deeply disturbed by the contradiction between the authoritarian methods of the "Revolutionary Government" and its rhetoric of "social democracy of full participation." Curiously, the rhetoric has increasingly become the main justification for the regime's drift toward one-man rule, both in internal military politics and in Peru as a whole. Over the long run, however, the "Revolutionary Government" will have to choose between the authoritarian and democratic elements of this contradiction. Continued educational development could play a decisive role in this choice.

## II

The schools of Collique are a latter-day embodiment of the educational ideal of the Mexican Revolution, and may even bear some relevance to the military regime's propaganda about creating "a social democracy of full participation." The Mixed Primary School No. 2060 of the Fourth Zone of Collique, informally known as the Escuela Guadalupe, stands where the gray desert hills begin to rise toward the mountains outside Lima, about 12 miles north on the Avenida Tupac Amaru. The shack-covered hills are shrouded in mist in the early morning and are barren of vegetation, save for the small potato patches cultivated on the upper reaches of the hillsides alongside the first dwellings on newly occupied land. The huts are made of yellow straw matting called *estera* and crowned by red and white Peruvian flags that are both a symbol of nationhood and of the land invasions that have been taking place at the outskirts of Peru's major cities in recent decades. Whereas this slice of Peru's coastal desert was almost completely uninhabited before this first invasion of Collique took place in 1964, the 1972 census found Collique occupied by 26,478 persons and 5,884 houses, and it is still growing fast. The chill and drabness of the setting tend to muffle the intensity of human activity. The *barriada* squatter settlement of Collique is divided into five zones escalating up the hillside beyond the coastal ridge and into the first inland valley. Despite their provisional construction, the dwellings are laid out in rectangular blocks along broad streets; the houses are gradually remodeled from their original *estera* construction into permanent homes of one or two stories with adobe brick walls covered by a pastel-colored concrete façade. On Sundays Collique is a beehive of this kind of construction activity, the pace of which usually varies with the number of wage-earners and with the saving capacity of each household to generate the man-hours and money needed to invest in home improvement. The bulk of the vehicular traffic along the main street of Collique is the seemingly endless stream of orange-colored "Collique-San Borjas" buses, usually driver-owned, which wait their turn in long lines at the top of the hill to take the residents of Collique into the center of Lima, picking up passengers on the way downhill toward the Avenida Tupac Amaru, past pharmacies, radio repair shops, and construction materials stores, a private maternity clinic and a movie

house called Cine Revolución, past schools and Pentecostal churches and a crowded *parada*, or marketplace, where vegetables, meat, school supplies, and household goods are sold in outdoor stalls. In all of Collique there is not one faucet fed by piped water. Consequently the second most important form of vehicular traffic along the dusty streets are the water tank trucks that labor their way up and down the hills all day selling water at six sols (US\$.15) per barrel in the winter and at about 12 sols during the summer, when the supply is shortest and the demand is at its height.


There are eight primary and three secondary schools in Collique, virtually all of them built by the *pobladores* themselves, as well as two kindergartens established under the auspices of a program headed by President Velasco's wife. The Escuela Guadalupe was founded in 1967 as a "communal school" by the neighbors of the Fourth Zone of Collique in a provisional building of straw matting which they erected shortly after putting up their own huts. José Lengua, a white-collar employee who was one of the few "invaders" of Collique to have finished his secondary education, served as the first president of the Asociación de Padres de Familia. "In the beginning the parents contributed benches for the school and some pedagogy students worked free as volunteer teachers," he said. "The school had six or seven classrooms made of *estera*, but the children suffered from the wind and the dust that blew in through the straw. Then we had raffles, a cake sale, and carnivals to raise money to change the materials from straw to wood.

"The Ford Motor Company donated three truckloads of wood, and Goodyear gave some other materials. We built our first brick classroom in 1970. All the neighbors had to contribute five Sundays of work. Those who didn't work had to donate a bag of cement or 50 sols for each Sunday they missed." After the October 1968 military coup, the new Interior Minister, General Armando Artola, visited Collique as part of the efforts of the "Revolutionary Government" to win the support of the *pobladores* of the squatter settlements. A gruff and flamboyant army politician, he tried to build a personal following for himself by giving speeches, holding court, and granting *pobladores'* requests in the *barriadas*—rebaptized *Pueblos Jóvenes* ("Young Towns") by the new regime. Artola was summarily fired from his job when he jailed the auxiliary bishop of Lima, Msgr. Luis Bambarén, known as the Bishop of the *Pueblos Jóvenes*, for having supported

a land invasion in 1971 to establish the El Salvador squatter settlement despite a government prohibition. Before his fall, however, Artola granted the request of the residents of the Fourth Zone of Collique that the Escuela Guadalupe become a public school, with teachers provided and paid by the Ministry of Education, and himself laid the first stone for the new building. Before the permanent building of the Escuela Guadalupe was completed, the neighbors of the Fourth Zone had founded a secondary school, Colegio José Galvis, a wood structure that was nearly destroyed by fire in 1970. Today the Escuela Guadalupe has 16 brick classrooms, all but four of them built by the parents themselves. The classrooms are used in two shifts, with 17 teachers working in the morning and 15 in the afternoon. In the summer of 1975 (January-March) both the primary and secondary schools were expanded by four classrooms each to meet rising enrollment pressures. "This year there were 400 new pupils entering the first grade," said Marcial Morán, the present head of the Parents' Association. "If we didn't add those four classrooms to the primary school, where would those kids study? For us the great event of the Education Reform is the nuclearization, which obliges everyone to study in his own zone. For this reason we are expanding the Colegio Galvis to accommodate the secondary students who are now commuting to the center of Lima."

Casimiro Izquierdo, 45, is a short and wiry native of the northern Department of Cajamarca who came to Lima in 1965 and works in Collique's marketplace. A member of the local Pentecostal church, he lives in the Fourth Zone with his wife and five children in a blue-painted wood shack with an earthen floor. "We are lucky this year because all my four children in school have been assigned government teachers," he said. "This is a great help because two years ago I had to pay 50 sols per month for each of them as my contribution for the salary of the teacher we hired. That's a lot of money when you earn only 70 sols (\$1.60) a day. We in Collique must do everything for ourselves, not like in Lima where the government does it all. I was an orphan and never finished the first grade. We send our kids to school with such sacrifice because we are poor and schooling is the only heritage we can leave our children. These days you can't find a job if you haven't finished primary. If a child doesn't study he is ignorant for the rest of his life."

I met Izquierdo at a parents' meeting at the Escuela Guadalupe on May Day 1974. Although it



(Top) A primary school of straw-matting (*estera*), La Humanitaria, financed by the parents themselves in the squatter settlement of Collique in Lima (1974). (Bottom) Inside the Escuela Humanitaria, Collique, Lima.


was a national holiday in Peru it was used by the parents to seek a solution to an urgent and unexpected problem. The community had worked all summer to construct four new classrooms, but then learned that the Ministry of Education would not be fulfilling its prior commitment to provide chairs, desks, and blackboards. The teacher who conducted the meeting urged the 32 parents who attended to seek an appointment with the Minister of Education to pressure the government into keeping its promise. "It's a matter of *coima* [political influence]," she told me later. "The Ministry never has enough desks to meet the demand, and it's generally the better connected teachers, parents, and administrators from the middle-class neighborhoods who get them." Once it was clear to everyone that they would have to solve the problem themselves, the discussion focused on two questions. The first was whether each parent should make an individual desk for each child, or whether all should join in making desks that would be used in the morning and afternoon shifts and belong to the school as a whole. While the latter alternative was approved overwhelmingly, the prolonged discussion of this point reflected a quest for simple justice that was not always easy to achieve. If the desks were built communally, how would those parents who failed to participate in the project be prevented from benefiting from it? On the other hand, it was a matter of great concern among all parents that the children of those who didn't participate not be punished or humiliated for their parents' failure. In the course of the discussion, the teacher stressed that six- and seven-year-old children could not stand all day for an entire school year because their classroom lacked furniture. The second question was whether the parents should buy the materials and build the desks themselves, or to contract a carpenter. The costs had to be measured carefully, for this was a major expense for families with incomes of less than two dollars daily. It was argued that, while a carpenter might do a better job that might be cheaper in the end, carpenters often get drunk or take on too many jobs, so that the delivery of the desks might be delayed even though the parents would have given the carpenter an advance for materials. A committee was named to investigate the costs and prospects and report back in a few days. "Last year we had to pay 98 sols each for ready-made desks," Casimiro Izquierdo said in the discussion. "It costs 55 sols just for wood alone."

The schools of Collique dramatize the enormous demographic pressures on Lima's school system.

Collique is located in the District of Comas which, when it was established as an administrative unit in 1961, consisted of a few haciendas and irrigated truck farms and dry hills with spreading but still incipient squatter settlements, a combined total of 8,015 houses and 34,728 people. By 1972 the population of Comas had quadrupled—173,101 inhabitants in 32,001 houses, increasing the density from 4.0 to 5.4 persons per dwelling. The proliferation of these squatter settlements is one of the main reasons why Lima's population has quintupled, from 645,000 to 3.3 million, between the census years of 1940 and 1972.

While Lima grew at 5.25 per cent annually over this entire period, its share of the population in cities of more than 20,000 declined from three-fourths to three-fifths because of the even faster growth of secondary cities like Arequipa, Trujillo, Chimbote, Huancayo, and Chiclayo, most of which also experienced dramatic expansion of *barriada* communities.<sup>20</sup> In an extremely revealing national census of the *Pueblos Jóvenes* carried out by the military regime in 1970, 73 per cent of the Lima-born population of the *barriadas* of northern Lima—where Collique lies—was under 15 years old, while 57 per cent of the migrant population was in the 15-39 age group. Correspondingly, four-fifths of the labor force in the Lima *barriadas* were migrants. The crude birthrate was nearly 40 per 1,000, with seven children under five years old for every 10 women of childbearing age (15-49), although fertility among the 20 per cent of women who worked was one-third less than those who didn't. Among single men who migrated to Lima in the 1956-1965 period, education was given as the second most important reason (after finding work) for their decision to move. Educational and economic incentives have combined to draw many of the most capable provincials into Lima, rewarding them with dramatic increases in consumption levels. According to a careful study of *barriada* income levels by Robert A. Lewis:

.... the inhabitants of *barriadas* and squatter settlements are often viewed as peripheral or marginal to the economic system of the urban area in which they live. They are thought to be largely unemployed or marginally employed in "bloated" trade and service sectors in which their productivity and income are very low. This view is reinforced by the unsightly and provisional appearance of the provisional shacks in the



The parents at Sunday voluntary work, adding four new classrooms to the Escuela Guadalupe, Collique, Lima.

younger *barriadas* which suggest dire poverty. There is some truth to these views. About 30 per cent of the economically active population in the *barriadas* was found to be unemployed or underemployed. Between 10.8 and 17.1 per cent were employed in marginal occupations—i.e., domestic servants and street vendors—characterized by low incomes. And about 10 per cent of the *barriada* households earned an income which was very close to the subsistence level. However, a common error has been to assume that *most* of the inhabitants of the *barriadas* and other squatter settlements were barely eking out an existence by finding odd jobs in the city. In fact, the majority of the work force in the *barriadas* were found to be employed in working-class occupations in the manufacturing, construction, and transportation sectors with incomes which were very similar to those of wage earners in

the metropolitan area as a whole. The proportion of the *barriada* population that was employed in trade and services was no more than a percentage point or two above the metropolitan average....The average real income of *barriada* households grew from \$57 per month in 1956 to \$76 per month in 1967, an increase of 33.5 per cent. Real per capita income in the *barriadas* grew from \$132 per year in 1956 to \$157 per year in 1967, an increase of 19.3 per cent. The most important factor in explaining these increases was a rise in the general wage level in the metropolitan area.<sup>21</sup>


One of the most striking indicators of the increase both of incomes and personal consumption in Metropolitan Lima in recent decades has been the expansion of schooling. While the population of Lima grew at 5.25 per cent annually in the 1940-1972 period, school and university enrollments



A girl studying at home, Collique, Lima.

grew at 7.9 per cent, or half again as fast. (For a closer look at the relationship of future enrollment and population growth, see Part I, Appendices II and III.) The bulk of the difference in the two growth rates was absorbed by secondary and university enrollments. Whereas there were only 17,344 secondary students in the Department of Lima in 1942—nearly two-thirds of them in private schools catering to the middle and upper classes—there were 338,856 secondary students in 1973, a twenty-fold increase, with more than three-fourths in public schools. The increase in university enrollments is even more dramatic. Whereas there were only 3,109 students at Lima's only two universities in 1942, there were 80,702 in the city's 14 universities in 1973. The Education Ministry reported that in 1970-1972 roughly some 47 per cent of Lima's population between the ages of five and 39 was engaged in some kind of formal education.<sup>22</sup> According to the 1970 census of *Pueblo Jóvenes*, migrant men in the *barriadas* of north Lima showed higher educational achievement than either Lima-born men or women living in the *barriadas*. Fully one-third of the *barriada* residents of north Lima had at least some secondary education. In the *Pueblos Jóvenes* of Lima as a whole, 76.1 per cent of all primary-age children attended classes in 1970, compared with


Jorge Huamán Coronado, director of the Escuela Guadalupe, Collique, Lima.







Maria Isabel Riera, 26, a pupil at the night primary school of Collique, Lima.



Casimiro Izquierdo in Escuela Guadalupe, Collique, Lima.

only 61.1 per cent for the city as a whole (including middle and upper class areas) in 1960. This special 1970 census reported that in the *barriadas* of north Lima 63.4 per cent of boys and 55.6 per cent of girls in the 15-19 age group had some secondary education, while 9.1 per cent of the men in the 25-29 age group had attended a university. Illiteracy was concentrated largely among migrant women above age 30, at between 10 and 15 per cent, while men below age 40 showed illiteracy rates well below two per cent.

These statistics come dramatically alive in Collique. One has the impression that the schools in these *barriadas* have become a central focus of hope and communal activity, as envisioned a half-century ago in the educational thesis of the Mexican Revolution. Indeed, without them, life in the *barriadas*, despite some economic progress, would assume the barrenness suggested by the physical aspect of the gray hills and the shacks.

The night school of *Fé y Alegria* functions at the entrance to Collique, alongside the Avenida Tupac Amaru. Enclosing a sprawling school yard where

pupils play soccer, volleyball, and basketball during the day, it is housed in a large cinderblock building of classrooms, which are used almost continuously from eight in the morning until ten o'clock at night. Since the building has no electric current, classes are conducted by the light of kerosene lamps. The students are mainly migrant workers and housewives, many of them *cholo* women who nurse infants at the breast while sitting in the chilled, crowded, and dimly lit classrooms. "We have to turn away students because there's not enough space and not enough teachers," said Leoncio Antonio Pineda Céspedes, the night school's young director. "We have more dropouts than in day school, about half of the 300 who enroll, but the initial demand is very great. We've been talking about organizing five new night schools in Collique. People especially want to study secondary here." Pineda was conducting a second-grade class himself because the regular teacher was fired two months before for excessive absences, and a replacement could not be obtained. For my benefit, he led a lively discussion—which I taped—of why workers and housewives like themselves made such an effort to study at night. Luisa

Calzado de Sanabria, a 31-year-old mother of six children from the mountains of the Department of Lima, explained very quietly: "We study to know a little more, to be able to express oneself and not to always be lowering our heads, so we won't always appear ridiculous before the authorities when we have to deal with them. The Education Reform says we can study now without documents. Before you needed a birth certificate or a certificate of studies. I couldn't study before because I was an orphan and had been working since I was six or seven years old, pasturing sheep and hauling wood and working the fields. When I got to Lima years ago they robbed my papers and I couldn't get others because they had disappeared from the public registry. I now have four children in school. My studying at night helps me to help my children study. It is important that a mother not be more ignorant than her children, so they won't have to go to a neighbor to ask questions about their lessons. When a teacher sends a note home to me with one of my children, I want to be able to read it and answer it correctly."

Rufina Yolanda Ruiz Guillén, whose husband works as a street vendor, at 37 is the mother of 10 children. "While I have three children in school here and want to help them study," she said, "I also want to help my husband economically. After I finish the fourth grade of primary I want to study sewing and clothes-making. But to do this I must be able to

write to put down people's names, and to be able to add and subtract to calculate costs in the sewing business."

On the main street of Collique is a new school of straw matting called La Humanitaria, which is attended by some 100 pupils whose parents pay from 50 to 80 sols (between one and two dollars) monthly to pay the teachers and maintain the school. None of the teachers in this "communal school" have normal school or university degrees, except for the titular director, who just lends his name to the school so it can be accredited with the Ministry of Education. The person who really runs the school is Yolanda Choy, a small, demure woman of 41 who has been living in Collique since 1965 and who only learned to read herself in 1973 under the government literacy program. A recent convert to the Adventist Church, which itself has made a major contribution to rural education in Peru, Sra. Choy observed that reading the Bible had expanded her vocabulary and, in the manner of other Collique residents, gave simple and practical reasons for trying to learn more. "Many wives don't know how to read their husbands' pay envelopes, and the men want them to stay that way. Because I couldn't read his pay envelope, my husband gave me only 300 sols (seven dollars) per week and drank the rest. That is very little money when you're trying to raise five children, so you have to learn more to survive."

#### NOTES

1. José María Arguedas, *Todas las Sangres*, Lima: Biblioteca Peruana (2 volumes), 1973, Vol. I, p. 72.

2. Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, New York: Knopf, 1963, pp. 321-2.

3. Walter Peñaloza, "Panorama General de la Reforma Educativa," *Cantuta*, No. 8, Spring 1973, p. 66.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

5. Born in Vienna in 1926 of a Sephardic Jewish mother and a Yugoslav Catholic father, Illich received his doctorate at the University of Salzburg at age 24 and went on to study theology at Rome's Gregorian University before being ordained to the priesthood in 1951. He speaks several languages and had served as head of the Catholic University in

Ponce, Puerto Rico, before founding the Centro Intercultural de Documentación at Cuernavaca in 1961 with support from Fordham University.

6. A description of the impact of expanded schooling is provided by the *U.S. Army Area Handbook for Bolivia* (Washington, 1963, p. 208): "Education is... considered to be the most important single factor in the removal of the social stigma associated with *cholo* status [Indians converting to Hispanic culture]... Although their own education is but rudimentary and their wives are often illiterate, they manage in most cases to secure at least some secondary education for their children. A few have succeeded in sending at least one of their sons or daughters to private secondary schools. Second-generation *cholos* with at least four years of secondary education have become lesser politicians, civil servants, or teachers. *Cholo* teachers take considerable pride in their

status. Since nearly all of them attended exclusively urban schools, they communicate in Spanish only and have forgotten their native Aymará or Quechua dialect. Moreover, having been exposed to the overwhelmingly academic curricula of secondary schools, second-generation *cholos* attach great value to a liberal arts education and, unlike the rural Indian, tend to reject vocational training. Enrollment in schools, at least in urban areas, is synonymous with initiation into politics. Political activities among students begin at the primary level. It is not uncommon for first or second graders to participate in political rallies and to sustain physical injuries in the process." On the other hand, Bolivia's 20-year *Estrategia Socio-Economica del Desarrollo Nacional: 1971-1991* (La Paz: Ministry of Planning and Coordination, 1971, pp. 503-4), prepared by the Ovando regime while Baptista was Education Minister, views the phenomenon more pessimistically: "Enrollment in primary education is growing annually at 4.5 per cent, a higher rate than vegetative population growth. Nevertheless, educational services have not been able to absorb the whole school-age population; the 1970 estimates show a serious deficit of 42 per cent among 1.1 million children between six and 14 years old, which means that 466,000 children cannot obtain the benefits of primary education and potentially will swell the total of illiterates.... [This deficit] is aggravated by the inefficiency of the system at all levels, which is translated into low productivity in terms of dropouts, failures and repeated years. On the national average, one of every two primary pupils abandon schooling before finishing, many of them in the early grades."

7. Illich, *Deschooling Society*. New York: Harrow Books, 1972, pp. 1-2.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

9. From Illich, "The Alternative to Schooling," *Saturday Review*, June 19, 1971.

10. Illich, "The Futility of Schooling in Latin America," *Saturday Review*, April 20, 1968.

11. Illich, "Education: A Consumer Commodity and a Pseudo-Religion," *The Christian Century*, Vol. 88, No. 50, December 15, 1971, p. 1,467.

12. The 1973 World Bank loan report on the Education Reform provides familiar statistics showing that those with at least some primary education earn triple the average in-

come of those with no schooling; those with some secondary education earn nearly double the average income of those with some primary; and those with some university education earn nearly double that of those with only secondary. Also, the higher the education attainment, the lower the unemployment rate in each group. Class origins may share responsibility with education as a determining factor for these differences, but education has been the main instrument for breaking these class barriers. See World Bank, *Peru: Appraisal of a First Education Project*, Washington, November 1973 (R73-250-A), mimeographed, p. 3.

13. Richard Webb, *Trends in Real Income in Peru, 1950-1966*. Princeton University: Woodrow Wilson School Research Program in Economic Development, Discussion Paper No. 41 (mimeographed), 1974, p. 15. Webb's entire study will be published by the Harvard University Press. I quote here from individual chapters issued at Princeton.

14. Webb, *Government Policy and the Distribution of Income in Peru: 1963-1973*, Princeton: WWS Discussion Paper No. 39, March 1974, p. 31.

15. Webb, *Trends in Real Income in Peru, op. cit.*, pp. 28-9.

16. Peñaloza, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

17. From Gavin W. Jones, "Effect of Population Change on the Attainment of Educational Goals in the Developing Countries," in National Academy of Sciences, *Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications*, Vol. II, p. 336n.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 329 and 353.

19. Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Peru's Ambiguous Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 52, No. 4, July 1974, p. 800.

20. See Oficina Nacional de Estadística y Censos, *Los Pueblos Jóvenes en el Perú*. Lima, 1972, and *Censo de Pueblos Jóvenes 1970: Vol. II, Asistencia Escolar, Nivel de Educación*, Lima 1973.

21. See Lewis, Robert A., *Employment, Income and the Growth of the Barriadas in Lima, Peru*. Cornell University, Latin American dissertation series #46 (1973), p. 333.

22. Ministerio de Educación, *Plan Operativo regional 1974: Lima Metropolitana* (mimeographed).

Part IV concludes the series, *Peru's Education Reform*.